Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi is probably the last among commanders of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan in the Bangladesh war to write on what led to the surrender of Dhaka. In The Betrayal of East Pakistan he says Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and General Yahya Khan ``hatched a conspiracy'' to lose East Pakistan. He says the government did not go to the UN Security Council straight away to give India time to win the encounter and attacks Bhutto for not pressing friendly countries in the UN to negotiate a ceasefire.Niazi confirms Nawaz Sharif's recent admission in Dhaka that it was a mistake not to have handed power to Mujibur Rahman's Awami League after it won a majority in the 1970 polls in East Pakistan. ``It was a consistent policy of all the rulers to deprive the East Pakistanis of their legitimate right of participation in the governance...of the country,'' says Niazi.
That India attacked Pakistan in the west has been the contention of Islamabad. Niazi says Pakistan started the war. Hisinterrogation after his surrender reveals he ``was not told of the preemptive strike and start of operations in West Pakistan before they took place''. He had advised his Government against full-scale operations. ``East Pakistan would have to bear the force of a major Indian offensive with which he would not be able to cope with his existing resources''.
Niazi expresses no remorse for his debacle: ``Our west Pakistan army let us down by not launching the offensive to win the battle of east Pakistan in the west, which they were supposed to do and for which they had enough forces, ample resource and initiative...We at least saved West Pakistan by pinning down 12 Indian divisions.'' The impression that he was waiting for the Chinese intervention is confirmed. He reproduces what he wrote on December 5, 1971. ``I am informed by GHQ that Chinese help will soon be forthcoming. This is a farce...'' He recalls the assurance before hostilities began that Islamabad would stay in touch with his forces ``via the humproute over China and Tibet''. He says, ``When the Indians did impose the blockade, I spoke to General Hamid (next to General Yahya Khan) about using the `hump route'. He said, `Sorry, Niazi, we cannot use the route, you are on your own, carry on with whatever you have good luck.' I was abandoned in midstream''.
Niazi has a poor opinion of our commanders. ``Their plan suffered from numerous inadequacies...Having the full support of the local population and access to local resources and complete up-to-date information..., conducive circumstances, and a preponderance in everything, they over-assessed their fighting abilities and their chances of gaining a quick victory.''
He singles out Lt Gen J. S. Aurora, in charge of the Bangladesh operation, saying he ``frittered away all his resources against unimportant objectives. Had he concentrated all his armour in Rangpur-Hilli and Tura-Mymensingh sector, which were ideal tank terrains, he would have achieved better results''. Lt Gen J.F.L. Jacob, Aurora'snumber-two, also says in Surrender at Dhaka that Aurora was ``completely overawed by General S.H.F. Manekshaw''. He says when Manekshaw admonished senior officers, Aurora remained silent. This ``further strained relations between some formation commanders and the army commander (Aurora)''.
Niazi gives an insight into Bhutto's mind. When the two met in Sukkur Jail before his internment, Bhutto said: ``Niazi, I am really sorry for being hard on you. When we go back, we will work together.'' I said, ``Mr Bhutto, how can we work together?...We are more or less enemies''. He said, ``Niazi, I realised my mistake and tried to compensate you but you refuse my offers...'' I said, ``Now you tell me why you sent me to jail''. He said: ``You were becoming dangerous to us.''
His worst indictment is of Zia-ul-Haq: ``Zia was neither a good General nor a good administrator...He kept promising democracy but never delivered it, and made a mockery of Islam...He introduced Kalashnikovs and heroin...made his relativesrich and gave Siachin to the Indians.''
Dhaka was the key to Niazi's strategy. Jacob laments that the importance of Dhaka was not even considered by the Chiefs of Staff in Delhi. ``The capture of towns is time-consuming and costly in lives...'' He agrees with Niazi that the capture of Dhaka should have been given top priority.
Niazi is on firm ground in saying he objected to a `surrender ceremony'. Jacob, who discussed the terms of Pakistan's surrender, says Niazi insisted on a ceasefire and there was an understanding that the document would take out his wishes. Jacob says he communicated this to General Manekshaw, who was ``non-committal''. Jacob expected something less than surrender. ``I took a careful look at the documents and was aghast to see the heading which read `Instrument of Surrender,''' he complains. Niazi says he had to agree to a surrender ceremony. ``They (Indians) blackmailed us by threatening to kill the loyal Bengalis. In fact, many young men were butchered and we were told that all thecivilians would be handed over to the Mukti Bahini.''
Niazi skips the surrender ceremony, but Jacob writes: ``I looked at my watch. It showed a time of 1655 hours. Niazi then undid his epaulets and removed his .39 revolver with attached lanyard and handed it over to Aurora. There were tears in his eyes. It was getting dark. The crowd on the race course started shouting anti-Niazi and anti-Pakistan slogans and abuses. We were concerned about Niazi's safety, there being hardly any troops available at the race course. We senior officers formed a cordon around Niazi and escorted him to an Indian Army jeep.''
Niazi says: ``Ordered to lay down arms by the President to save West Pakistan, my mind swung between the two options risk West Pakistan being further overrun, or jeopardise my reputation, my career, my future, and the high tradition of the Pakistan Army by submitting to the orders, I had accepted a task beset with hazards and difficulties, when East Pakistan was in disarray and disorder.'' He does notexplain why his forces killed hundreds of Bengali intellectuals just before the surrender. However during the interrogation when asked why he had armed so many unreliable Razakars, he said this was under the orders of the central and provincial governments.
Of course, Niazi defends himself all the way and takes satisfaction in Aurora's reported remark that ``He had an impossible task under extremely difficult conditions. Any other General in these circumstances could not have done better.''
Copyright © 1998 Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd.
