While the Indian press would eventually gloat over the fact that the preparations at Pokharan went unnoticed, this success owes to the fact that most strategic observers read the party's manifesto as the logical way forward. But the decision to test resulted from the fragility of the coalition, to turn the nation's attention away from domestic political battles by taking a route that has been most popular with the ordinary citizen.

Having conducted a range of tests, the Indian scientific establishment amply demonstrated its capability despite international efforts to deny technologies. This in turn forced Nawaz Sharif to respond in kind. Resisting tremendous international pressures, Sharif was forced to succumb to domestic ones, especially from the armed forces and the small, right-wing parties that demanded a matching response from Islamabad.

Both countries having supplied their nuclear credentials, the international non-proliferation regime has the difficult task of merging the reality with thenorm. Its cornerstone, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), does not accept any new nuclear weapons state beyond January 1, 1967. Most Western countries that have based their national non-proliferation laws on the NPT have been forced to respond by invoking sanctions. But it has become clear that such piecemeal measures will not change ground realities in South Asia.

There has to be a clearer understanding of the security situation in the region, including the fact that nuclear capability is not merely a security option but reflects a desire for independence of action in international relations. It is also the bedrock of national pride. Any action by the West would require considerable introspection on its part on whether a discriminatory norm can become an acceptable basis of a global regime. In a shrinking world, security has become a seamless web, making such discriminatory efforts the very antithesis of a secure and predictable world order.

The international debate must move forward not byexhorting both countries to give up their nuclear capabilities through threats but through a commitment to create a new international security framework that obliges all countries to move towards a nuclear weapons-free world. In South Asia, the formula of `my security requires nuclear weapons and yours does not' has no takers. Sanctions and an economic downturn will only create an even more intransigent situation, moving the entire international community away from its goal.

The mood in the US Congress that sees the Indian action as a deliberate snub to its legislation to curb non-proliferation will result in efforts to come down hard on India and Pakistan. But such efforts will not change the fact that China will continue to represent a major security threat to Delhi. What is required at the moment is to seize the initiative of placatory moves by New Delhi, including the moratorium on further testing, the acceptance to negotiate a Fissile Materials Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) and a possible re-negotiation of theCTBT text to assuage Indian and Pakistani misgivings. It is not a question of whether such moves will encourage other countries to go down this path, but the broader issue of whether such actions would have been attempted if the international order had been devised in a transparent and non-discriminatory fashion.