``We believe that India and Pakistan are moving towards adherence to the CTBT,'' he said, adding what remained to be done was ``actual signing and ratifying the treaty.''

Inderfurth disclosed that during the talks so far, India and Pakistan had assured the US that they would ``remove obstacles to fissile material negotiations starting in Geneva, control exports of sensitive technologies and settle a modus vivendi for bilateral talks on their disputes, including Kashmir.''

He told Indian and Pakistani reporters at a special briefing yesterday that the next round of talks between Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Prime Minister's special emissary Jaswant Singh in November would be mainly on export controls.

He said the talksbetween Talbott and Jaswant and that with Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed is in ``for the long haul,'' that is ``there is no specific date for their conclusion.''

The US would suggest measures on finding a moratorium on fissile material production with the ``suspension, indeed a multilateral suspension as agreed by the P-5 with the exception of China,'' he said.

Inderfurth said since ``We are engaged in this discussion, we hope there can be clarity and definition as soon as possible,'' and India and Pakistan should structure a restraint regime covering both nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in line with their statements on minimal deterrence.

Stating that India had security concerns beyond its neighbour to the north-west, Inderfurth said China was an important part of India's strategic calculations and concerns and ``therefore, they (India) are looking not only for a restraint regime that would take into account Pakistan's problems and intentions but also China's.''

He said,``These are not for us to decide. These are sovereign decisions that must be made by both India and Pakistan.''

Referring to India's statement in New York that it had no intention of matching China's strategic nuclear programme (missile for missile, warhead for warhead), the Assistant Secretary of State said ``these are difficult decisions, fundamental decisions, sovereign decisions.''

``Now that we are all engaged in this discussion, we hope that there can be such clarity and definition as soon as possible, because it is a confidence- building measure for all parties to have the same sense of where they are going with their future programmes, which may allow decisions to be taken, on, for instance, fissile material (production) suspension or missile development or deployment which is a great concern to all those who look at this issue,'' he added.