Islamabad is also likely to call for the strengthening of the UN Military Group observers with the authority to patrol the Line of Control (LC) and to report back to the UN Security Council.

Kashmir, peace and security including CBMs are on the agenda when Foreign Secretary K Raghunath begins the composite dialogue process with his Pakistani counterpart, Shamshad Ahmad on October 15.

The "two plus six" format for the talks was agreed to by the Prime Ministers of the two countries when they met in New York on September 23 on the sidelines of the U N General Assembly. The Foreign Secretaries would directly lead the talks on Kashmir and peace and security issues, while the six other issues including Siachen, maritime boundaries, trade and commerce and people topeople contacts would be tackled by the concerned officials in November in New Delhi.

Coming under the head of "human rights" will be a series of measures that Islamabad will insist are critical to improve the human rights situation on the ground in Kashmir. This would include the release of Kashmir detainees, stationing of International Red Cross and UN human rights monitors, the cessation of search and arrest powers given to the armed forces and information on missing persons.

On the military side, the CBMs would also include the removal of Indian army pickets and military bunkers. Additionally Pakistan is expected to demand the recognition of the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) as the legitimate representative of the people of Kashmir.

Many of these CBMs were contained in a "non-paper" that Pakistan made public at Colombo in July this year. But Islamabad appears to be in two minds about the last demand, that of the APHC representing the people of Kashmir.

Pakistan Foreign Secretary ShamshadAhmad on Wednesday said Pakistan was negotiating the talks on behalf of the Kashmir people.

According to experts here, many of these CBMs are not new. Every time that India and Pakistan have sat down to pick up the threads of the much-disrupted talks, Islamabad has dredged up a compendium of measures which it projects as being absolutely imperative for progress on any other front.

Islamabad had a similar laundry list of demands when talks were disrupted in January 1994. The 1994 demands included withdrawal of additional forces deployed in Kashmir since 1990, withdrawal of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), unrestricted access to Kashmir for human rights organisations, access for the media and the release of Kashmiri political activists among others. India has countered Pakistan's position with the argument that Kashmir is an integral part of India and that the problems there are in large part due to terrorism, funded and actively supported by Pakistan. At Islamabad, thistime too New Delhi will drive home the fundamental cause of the Kashmir problem stemming from Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorist activities in the state.

According to analysts here, many of the CBMs are contingent on Pakistan calling off its proxy war in the Kashmir valley, which it has shown no inclination of doing. India, therefore has no option but to meet the challenge posed by Pakistan. Pakistan has a vested interest in ensuring that the talks remain inconclusive, analysts maintain. Pakistan's attempts would be to show that the bilateral format has failed, and that the situation in a nuclear-armed neighbourhood warrants mediation by the international community.