However, the Taliban regime does not represent Afghanistan in all its ethnic and sectarian diversity. It represents the Pakhtoons who arelargely Sunni and speak Pushto. Despite the assistance extended by Pakistan, it is doubtful whether the Taliban regime, once having consolidated itself, will remain a protege of Pakistan or whether it will turn into a Frankensteins's monster.

There is yet another factor of instability built into the situation. Since the end of the First World War Afghanistan has been undergoing a process of modernisation, which was initiated by the late King Amanullah Khan. Over the last 80 years the process has produced a modern elite who are at home, academically and socially, in the West. They may be lying low now but will they accept the Taliban regime? More than that, will the people who are divided among tribes, which are committed to their own tribal customs and traditions, ever accept a homogenising orthodoxy?

Geostrategically, the new Taliban regime in Afghanistan prima facie poses a threat to all its neighbours: the CIS countries, Iran, India and, in my view, even to Pakistan. Pakistan is likely to face revivedpressures not only on the question of Pakhtoonistan but also on the transformation of Pakistan into an Islamic State. There are already forces in Pakistan including some leading Ulema which look upon Afghanistan as a model for Pakistan and propose to take the help of the ruling elite in Afghanistan if the Pakistani establishment continues to dodge the Islamic thrust.

The question also arises whether the UN will succeed in moderating the regime by responding to its needs through international assistance and at the same time making it conditional upon normalisation of internal situation and abstention from territorial and ideological adventurism. Despite its awesome determination to root out at any cost the transborder terrorism sprouting in Afghanistan, the US is not likely to exert decisive pressure on the Taliban regime.

India should expect intensification of the proxy war being fought presently in Jammu and Kashmir with the influx of the Pakistani, Afghan and other foreign militants, some of themideologically motivated and some mercenaries. In the short term, Pakistan may have an advantage in Kashmir because of the adversary relationship between Delhi and Kabul but in the long run Pakistan is bound to feel the thrust of Islamic fervour and Pakhtoon nationalism.

However, India and Pakistan both should see the long term threat to the security of the subcontinent and set the ball rolling for a peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem. It is not impossible to develop a joint strategy and persuade Pakistan to join hands since the Taliban shadow is likely to fall on it before it reaches India. In coordination with Iran and the CIS States, India and Pakistan can contain the ideological expansiveness of the Taliban regime. It is possible with the support of the US and Russia and with the acquiescence of Iran and Pakistan, the UN may intervene effectively to bring the civil war to an end, impose peace and create conditions for the emergence of a democratic Afghanistan which will be at peace with all itsneighbours.