Arafat had agreed early in the day to the US plan involving a phased withdrawal by Israel from 13 per cent of West Bank land in tandem with a number of concrete steps by the Palestinians against terrorists. It was Netanyahu, caught between hardliners in his coalition and domestic and international accusations of reneging on Oslo, who stalled all the way to Wye. Were it not for intense, formidable and unprecedented American efforts to pin down the Israeli prime minister, it is doubtful if Wye would have produced a document for signature. To that extent it can be said the combined weight of the US president himself as well as the secretary of state anddirector of central intelligence was essential.

However, Wye went further than putting Clinton's authority on the line to achieve a successful outcome. As a consequence of treating it as a make-or-break process, Washington has committed itself even more deeply to keeping the peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. As the guarantor of the interim agreement, Washington undertakes the responsibility of seeing that both sides stick to their promises. Second, for the first time, the CIA has an overt role to play in Israeli-Palestinian security arrangements.

Third, Clinton is slated to attend, and put his imprimatur as it were, to a Palestinian National Council session at which the PLO charter will be formally amended. In all these areas domestic politics and rightwing reaction will be major determinants of the kind of action either Netanyahu or Arafat take to meet their obligations under Wye. The risks for the US in circumstances which put serious limitations on its role as honest broker, are notinsignificant. But even those risks are small by comparison to the unspoken but clear responsibility to play midwife to a final settlement by the deadline of May 4 next year on the most contentious issues of the status of Jerusalem and Palestinian statehood.

A major foreign policy success is very much what Clinton needed at this time of domestic troubles. But that was only one of the reasons why he had such a high stake in Wye. The other was the need to revive the Middle East coalition which the stalled Oslo process had caused to fall apart as was seen during the last American bid to take military action against Iraq.

Egypt and Jordan have both backed the Wye deal and with their support Washington can begin to repair the damage in the Middle East and shore up the confidence of friendly regimes. For the Palestinians the gains are also clear. With Oslo back on track and the Americans more closely involved, Arafat's hand will be strengthened in the tussle for power with Hamas and others opposed to makingpeace with Israel. Within Israel it is as yet unclear who will get the upper hand: those who believe a peace settlement will work or those who fear it will not.