"We are under no illusions that either country will alter or constrain its defense programs under duress or simply because we have asked it to. That's why we've developed proposals for near-term stems that are, we believe, fully consistent with the security requirements that my Indian and Pakistani counterparts articulated," he said. However, these requirements, as articulated by the Prime Ministers of the two countries, had to be defined at the "lowest possible levels". The proposals that Talbott was referring to were obviously related to the restraint regime being advocated as one of the "five practical steps"prescribed by the Clinton administration in its exchanges with the two sides.

The United States is pressing India and Pakistan to adopt a series of "strategic restraint measures" including constraints on the development, flight testing, and storage of missiles. The US sought to extend these controls also to the basing of nuclear-capable aircraft. The other four steps constituted a more familiar checklist: Sign and ratify the test ban treaty; stop production of fissile material pending a formal treaty; tighten export controls; and talks on peace and security, including the underlying cause of Kashmir.

Speaking for the first time about the broad content of the talks, Talbott disclosed that discussions in this sphere had "moved beyond principles to the practical stage" and there had been technical exchanges on the subject.

In this connection, US discussions with the two countries "involved limitations on the development and deployment of missiles and aircraft capable of carrying weapons of massdestruction." Washington was pressing for "a package of prudent constraints" in this matter, he said.

While the US has previously put pressure on India to cap its missile program, it is only recently that American officials have spoken of including nuclear-capable aircraft in the restraint regime.

Many modern jet fighters, including the F-16, Mirages, and Sukhoi, can be configured to carry nuclear weapons, although such design changes are not easy.

Talbott's suggestion that the restraint regime should take into consideration the basing of aircraft implies that the US wants the two sides to put in place a foolproof and secure firedrill to prevent an accident based on misunderstanding or miscalculation.

In at least one instance, US journalist Seymour Hersh reported that Pakistani aircraft loaded with nuclear weapons were on alert following escalation of tensions with India in 1990 and it required a trip to the region by Deputy National Security Adviser William Gates to defuse the situation. The storywas subsequently debunked in Indian and Pakistani circles, but it has been used to paint an alarming picture of the `hair-trigger situation' in the region.

Talbott's remarks also appeared to speak to India's missile program, which after a period of flux, is said to be humming again with the possibility of more Agni tests in the near future, including extending the parameters of the missile to arrive at an Agni 2.

The Deputy Secretary's speech, heard by the cream of Washington's South Asia-related foreign policy sages, and delivered under the aegis of the Brookings Institution, resounded clearly with a hard-line US position after six rounds of talks each with India and Pakistan.

Talbott said the US remained committed to its long range goal of universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and there was no question of treating India and Pakistan as nuclear weapons states with all the attendant implications and benefits.

"We do not, we will not, concede, even by implication, that India andPakistan have established themselves as nuclear-weapons states under the NPT. Unless and until they disavow nuclear weapons and accept safeguards on all their nuclear activities, they will continue to forfeit the full recognition and benefits that accrue to members in good standing of the NPT," Talbott said. The remarks seemed to disabuse the impression in some quarters that the US was willing to accord India some sort of intermediary nuclear status and also allow it to be a part of the international nuclear regime which will facilitate exchange of nuclear materials and technology.