Discussions on the six remaining items of the agenda of Indo-Pak talks began on November 5 and ended on November 13. Kashmir and security problems were discussed in Islamabad from October 15 to 17. Discussions on all eight subjects have been inconclusive, as expected. India agreed to this revived dialogue without illusions about a Pakistani willingness to move to practical compromises. However, it had two tenuous expectations.

First that Pakistan might agree to expand confidence-building measures under the agenda item `security'. And second that it might consider the agreements on issues like Siachen and the Tulbul navigation project, reached between 1989 and 1992, as terms of reference. Even this proved wrong. There was no meeting ground in the discussions on Kashmir. It was acomplete stand off.

Discussions on sub-continental security were characterised by Pakistan rejecting our suggestions on no-first-use. On expanding the scope of the existing agreement on non-attack on each other's nuclear installations, Pakistan instead demanded reduction and removal of troops from Kashmir, a no-war agreement and a discussion on methods to ensure strategic and nuclear restraints. India agreed to discuss the last two while rejecting the reduction or withdrawal of Indian armed forces from J&K.

On Siachen, Pakistan decided to have amnesia on the discussions between Oct-Nov '89 to November 1992 and the agreement on mutually acceptable withdrawals from Siachen. There have been ill-informed or deliberately misleading media writings asserting that India refused the reasonable Pakistani suggestion that the 1989 agreement on Siachen be implemented. I was a participant in all the discussions on Siachen between 1989 and 1994. The June 1989 discussions between the Defence Secretaries led only to anagreement on the terms of reference for a solution to the Siachen confrontation.

The agreed terms were: (a) both would pull back from the forward positions of their troops to mutually agreed positions; (b) redeployment by both sides to positions as close as possible to those before the confrontation on Siachen in the mid-'80s; (c) further discussions on how to determine the Line of Control northward from Grid reference point NJ9842. Particularly in view of Pakistan's unacceptable demand that the Line should be drawn north-eastwards to the Karakoram Pass; (d) discussing measures to monitor the No-Man's land created by mutual withdrawals to ensure that neither moves forward from the positions to which they have withdrawn. Further discussions ultimately led to the written agreement resolving all the above problems, initialled by both sides in November 1992.

Narasimha Rao being enmeshed in the Babri Mosque controversy, and Pakistan under Nawaz Sharif remaining assertively intrusive in Kashmir, meant thepolitical leadership's refusal to move to implement the agreement. In 1989 Pakistan had agreed to withdraw from specific points in the Siachen area without confirming these positions with specific grid references on the map. They also did not agree to give up their demand to draw the Line of Control north-eastwards from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass.

In the November '92 discussions it was agreed to leave the delineation of the Line of Control northward for later discussions. Pakistan reluctantly accepted the Grid reference from the positions from which we and they would withdraw. The point is that no detailed agreement on Siachen was reached in the 1989 talks. Next, the Foreign Secretaries had no direct role in discussing the issue but only took note of the broad terms of reference agreed in 1989. Pakistan trying to make vague the 1989 terms of reference on Siachen the substance of the agreement, and rejecting further operational and procedural agreements of 1992, signify an attempt to go back to square oneon Siachen. In the context of its official statements Pakistan has the right to Siachen heights, and territory extending up to the Karakoram Pass. It has described the Novem-ber '92 agreement on Siachen as outdated because of events in Kashmir and Indo-Pakistan relations since then.

The Tulbul navigation project/Wullar barrage issue was also more or less resolved at the technical level by the two countries by October 1991. India agreed to adjust the height of the barrage, the sizes of the sluice gates and the projected rate of discharge of water, responding to Pakistani demands. On November 5, Pakistan revived the basically negative argument that this barrage on the Jhelum was a violation of the provisions of the Indus Water Treaty and that it affects Pakistani interests, which is both legally and technically an inaccurate assertion.

The outcome of talks on Sir Creek was similar. Pakistan insisted on fixing the boundary at the eastern extremities of the Creek with an eye on additional territories andexpanding their Prospective EEZ in the coastal waters in the Arabian Sea, which would be detrimental to India's interests.

Talks on economic and commercial cooperation, checking of drug trafficking and promotion of friendly relations, showed marginally better results.How to assess the talks and future prospects? Most important is to acknowledge that this round is not born of an inner conviction or a will on Pakistan's part to work out practical solutions based on ground realities. The animating influence is external pressure. To some extent this is true of India too. Pakistan would like the controversies to continue and international intervention. There is no change in Islamabad's fundamentally negative negotiating stance. There are some possibilities of agreement on tentative CBMs on nuclear and missile strategies, resulting from international concern and awareness of the dangers of such confrontation. We should not accept any resolution of issues related to Siachen, Wullar Barrage or Sir Creek in theshort term. There could be a meeting of minds on controlling drugs trafficking, but drugs also are a factor in ISI's subversive activities in India.

As to economic cooperation and expanding people-to-people contacts, these would remain subject to vagaries of populist politics in India and Pakistan, more so in Pakistan. The prospects for normalisation are not encouraging. It would be sufficient if both sides structure a stand-still relationship with minimal tension. Agreeing to continue bilateral discussions on all issues in the composite Agenda will help serve this limited objective.