The first condition can never apply in the case of India's armed forces, for recruitment patterns are so broad based that a cabal has no chance of ever appearing. As India's only example of `living secularism', the armed forces have proven their professionalism despite hiccups. The bogey of a coup, therefore, exists only in the imagination of some in the civil side of governance. The second ingredient, however, is a very live possibility, but only in terms of a mutinous action rather than an actual takeover attempt.

This is possible only because the civilian authority, political and/or bureaucratic, never tires ofmaking it known that the ultimate power resides with them. This has been demonstrated over the years on a number of occasions, and is still being enacted. The most pervasive example is, of course, that of the first prime minister and his defence minister making postings on the eve of the 1962 war.

Even as the then cantonment-fed Army made its anxiety known, the political elite determined otherwise. The end result was there for the country to see-- be humiliated, and weep with the moving words of Lata Mangeshkar's eulogy to the dead soldiers. Despite lessons this practice never really stopped, and whenever there was a defence minister with that peculiar bent of mind, a pri-me minister as a party or unable to prevail, and a defence bureaucracy eager to chip in with its own prejudices and fav-ourites, armed forces appointments were me-ssed with.

By the mid-1970s the armed forces too began to show signs of participating in this pernicious practice. Through caste, regional or political connections, a minorityof officers and jawans also made the trek to civilian interference in promotions, postings and appointments. The Emergency period was notorious for this phenomenon. The saving grace, if ever there could be one in such circumstances, was that the numbers were few and stakes not so high. In December 1998 that is not the case, for the numbers are reaching critical levels, and the stakes are very high.

The two cases that continue to trouble the government are illustrative of this creeping infection, and could be a benchmark for further disaster. Forget the personalities involved in these cases, but focus instead on the principles at stake. The genesis of both cases lie in the benevolence of the previous defence minister, in giving an extension of service to one gent, and a waiver in service requirements to the other.

The subsequent events have been highlighted enough in the columns of this newspaper to need any further elaboration. What, ho-wever, needs to be analysed is the effects of these shenanigans,decisions and verdicts on the institutional structures of of the armed forces. The simple message going out to all and sundry is that postings and appointments are possible despite any objections the service headquarters might well have. `Forget about the opinions of the chiefs and their commanders-in-chiefs, I could still get my posting through sufficient influence wielded by the political and bureaucratic class'. That, in a nutshell, is the singular lesson that emerges from the prevailing situation. And that is a very dangerous belief to spread, in any armed force, but more so in India where active combat duty is a daily occurrence.

In the cloistered confines of armed forces life there is one facet that is never available or open to the outside world: spoken reputation. It is a stamp that cannot be brushed away, no matter what the career profile of the officer may be. Even the annual confidential reports do not reflect the spoken reputation of an officer. A report may show an officer to be mediocre, butthe general impression could be that of an outstandingly brave leader of men in combat.

In the same way, an outstanding report could well be covering up a man who is untrustworthy and morally a liability. Those who are in the business of pushing files and cases are never privy to these profiles. And, thus, when the special boards set up at the service headquarters recommend appointments and postings, it is based on knowledge not available to the world outside. Many a gent has gone up in rank despite a poor spoken reputation, but does that mean such inputs should not be considered when the bureaucracy and the political leadership pass judgment? They wouldn't know, but surely they must be aware of what is at stake.

The authority of the services headquarters to send a man into combat, and possibly death, is at stake. With a war on the glacier, and two covert ones, this is a terrible risk to put the Army into. And this is an Army that recruits from every corner, caste and community in this vast country. So ifthis infection was permitted to spread, it would turn out to be a very deadly virus. And what of the Navy? A smaller, more remote service, but with the largest indigenous production projects waiting in the files, and heavy import proposals that seem to be seeing the light of day, is also the future of India's secure second strike nuclear option. India's minimum deterrence rests in the bowels of the submarine, but what has been done in the last week has made the Navy unfit for combat. And then the country is also at stake.