Laying out New Delhi's strategy on this issue, which is remarkably similar to what the US wants New Delhi to do, Singh said it would involve the separate acts of signing, ratification and the deposition of the instrument of ratification.

US officials have privately said that if India ``signs the Treaty,'' as distinct from ratifying it and depositing the instrument of ratification, such a step would be a ``strong signal'' towards moving the Indo-US dialogue forward.

In fact, in his opening remarks at the first press conference since he took over as minister, Singh outlined foreign policy vision in the new year, acknowledging that ``just and valid'' Western concerns would also be taken care of.

``This year was a year of stocktaking... a year in whichIndia and Indian statecraft was tested in its efforts of reconciling its security interests with the just and valid concerns the international community has about weapons of mass destruction.''

He was nevertheless unusually forthright on the US bombing of Iraq, criticising the bypassing of the Security Council and specifically, the ``human suffering'' of Iraq. ``Innocents must not suffer. India is mindful of its responsibility in the region,'' Singh said.

Singh also refused to be drawn into how relations between India and China would progress in the new year, telling a journalist from China that he had ``not drawn up any travel plans yet'' and therefore could not say if he would be visiting Beijing. He admitted that the bilateral joint working group meeting had not been fixed yet.

Singh reiterated that the government's nuclear programme was a continuation of what had gone before, that it had actually begun as far back as 1948, one year after Independence and under the stewardship of India's first primeminister Jawaharlal Nehru.

Criticising the BJP government about the nuclear programme's ungainly costs, therefore, was ``not only a complete misreading of the situation... (but also) fanciful.'' He also rejected the linkage with Islamabad, saying India's programme was not ``driven by or Pakistan-centric.'' Singh insisted, however, that the government's attempt at building consensus on foreign policy was bearing fruit, that today there was much greater ``parliamentary acceptance of altered ground reality.''

MPs understood much better the difference between 1996, when India refused to sign the CTBT, and post-Pokharan India, when the credibility of the nuclear deterrent had been assured. Two years ago if India had signed the CTBT ``it would have rendered the nuclear option unviable,'' he added, implying that New Delhi could now move on from that position.

Singh also buried half-a-century of ideology in the pursuit of foreign policy, saying that economic relations would form the ``bulwark'' of India's``forward-looking'' diplomacy and the endeavour to cooperate with the nations's neighbours would be on top of the agenda.