Of course, in the given situation, there is much weight in the government's argument that the purchase of T-90 tanks is necessary in the wake of Pakistan acquiring nearly 300 T-80 UD tanks from Ukraine. Today, nearly 40 percent of the Indian armoured fleet consisting of55-plus tank regiments, have the antiquated Vijayanta and T-55 tanks. Undoubtedly, with the T-90 replacing them, our armoured thrust in conventional warfare will improve substantially. The tank has a passive thermal imager, which will be extremely useful in night combat, which has been one of our weak areas.

Yet, the purchase of 300 T-90 tanks will not see us through in the long run. On paper, the strength of our 55 plus regiments looks impressive, against Pakistan's 35 plus tank regiments. But in reality, if one looks at the tank country that we have -- extending from Chhamb in J&K to Bhuj in Gujarat (about 1500 km area) -- our armoured capability is deficient. As of now, the mainstay of the Indian armoured corps are various versions of the Russian T-72 tank, which has been performing credibly during exercises. Compared to other world-class tanks, it is not only light (41 tons) but has a low silhouette, which does not make it a very conspicuous target. Yet, due to the close proximity of its ammunition boxto the crew, doubts have often been raised on the safety of the crew and the overall survivability of this tank in battle. Of late overhauling and upgradation efforts are underway to enhance its armour protection and night combat capability. This could in turn require an upgradation of the power of its engine. All this is a major effort, which is not only an expensive proposition but also time consuming.

It is here that the need to push the MBT project is important. The work on the MBT project, which started in 1974 (initially called Chetak and later renamed Arjun) has been laggard. The project got into some shape in 1984-85 when the DRDO started work on a fresh General Staff Qualitative Requirement (GS-QR). Since then efforts have been made to build a 1100 HP tank with a 120 mm smooth bore main gun (against the initial plan of 110 mm). The project got a significant push when Arun Singh was the minister in charge of defence and Gen K. Sundarji became the Chief of Army Staff. It was then decided to associateArmy officers who had sufficient experience of tank battle with the project. Soon after the tank was given to the Army for user trials.

Finally in February 1993 when Sharad Pawar was the Defence Minister, the tank was approved. Two successive chiefs, Gen. S.F. Rodrigues and the late Gen. B.C. Joshi, had taken close interest and overseen its performance in battle conditions. Gen. Joshi, an armoured corps officer, had personally fired the tank and found it satisfactory. It is not exactly indigenous since a lot of elements in the tank are imported. The 56-ton Arjun tank, which carries a four-man crew, is also heavier than the T-72 (which has a three-man crew), but those who have been associated with its trials say that it could compare with the world class tanks like Abraham of US and Leopard of Germany, if certain problems could be overcome.

There are reports that while the initial problems like overheating of the engine in desert runs have been resolved, the gunnery results continue to be wanting (hitpercentage is reportedly less than 80 percent).

In 1993 when it was decided to induct the tank, it was decided to equip four regiments during the eighth defence plan (1992-97) and eight more during the next plan. However, the induction plan never took off and only a squadron worth of about 12 tanks have been so far given to one of the armoured regiments.

Having lost valuable time during the last five years, which may have necessitated the purchase of T-90, the MBT project should be taken up in right earnest. Since no other country in this part of the world provides such a lucrative market as India to the foreign tank manufacturers, there is bound to be direct and indirect efforts to stall the MBT project. But the government must show the political will to withstand these pressures and push the indigenous effort. The MBT will now be our tank for the next century and it may be desirable to get a fresh GSQR from the Army on certain crucial points. For example, the Army has to decide whether MBT should havethe capability to fire missiles through its main gun, as some tanks have. A fresh time frame should be fixed for creation of production facilities for it. While Arjun could not be ready in time to replace Vijayanta and T-55 tanks, it should be ready at least by the time the T-72 tanks are ready to be phased out.