On the basis of a complaint filed by Josephine Jaya in September 1989 alleging cruelty and harassment at the hands of her in-laws, who had demanded more dowry, the police had chargesheeted her husband and five other in-laws under various sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) in October 1989.

Four of the accused had applied to the sessions court and had been discharged as the court had held that they had not demanded dowry and there was no material to show that they had instigated Jaya's husband to give her pregnancy termination medicine.

Challenging the sessions court order, Jaya had moved the Madras High Court in 1990 and in 1993 the court had set aside the order of discharge. Following this, the sessionscourt framed charges against these four accused on June 13, 1996.

The accused appealed against the order for framing of charges in the High Court, which observed even while dismissing the same that the proceedings have dragged on for eight years and the petitioners had not disclosed that a High Court had earlier directed that charges be framed against them.

The High Court, keeping in mind the conduct of the accused to delay the trial, had imposed costs of Rs 10,000 each on the accused to be paid to Jaya and had directed the sessions court to dispose of the case within two months. The four accused challenged it in Supreme Court.

The accused contended that the high courts have no jurisdiction to impose costs except as per the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Rejecting the argument, a division bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justice K T Thomas and Justice M B Shah said ``to prevent abuse of the process of court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, the high court is empowered topass such order which may include order to pay cost to the informant (complainant)''.

``This power (to award cost) is not conditioned or controlled by any other section nor is curtailed by any provisions which empower the court to award costs,'' it said.

The bench cited an earlier judgment of the apex court which said ``no legislative enactment dealing with the procedure can provide for all cases and that court should have inherent powers apart from the express provisions of law which are necessary for the proper discharge of duties.''

However, the bench said the High Court, while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, has power to pass `such orders' (not inconsistent with any provision of the code) including the order for costs in appropriate cases (i) to give effect to any order passed under the code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court or (iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice.