But the most significant fact established by the tapes is that the Kargil operation is conducted by the Pakistani army, not some faction in it, but by officers at the very top. There is a suggestion that the army's activities were kept secret from the Prime Minister of Pakistan until about the middle of May, that is, for at least six months, if not longer.

If true as seems likely, that would make it a rogue army. Other details confirm the picture of an army pursuing its own agenda on Kashmir and confident even as late asMay 29, after Indian airstrikes had begun, of being able to manipulate the military, domestic political and foreign policy fronts according to a preconceived plan. These features will lead to a better understanding of the hostilities on the Line of Control at home and abroad and of what India has to contend with.

It is clear India has to deal with a far more complicated scenario, politically and diplomatically, than may have appeared at first to be the case or indeed was the case in earlier military conflicts with Pakistan when the generals were fully in charge.

Today there is an elected but authoritarian government tainted by scandal and in conflict because of economic necessity and IMF pressure with the old feudal establishment; and there is a powerful army with links to the feudals which is relegated to secondary status but not yet reconciled to it. It is not only a question of who is in control in Pakistan but of which power centre is going to prevail on the Kargil issue and of how the conduct ofmilitary operations will affect and be affected by internal politics.

In this unpredictable situation international pressure will be crucial for scuttling the ambitions of the generals and for steeling the nerve of the civilian authority. Nawaz Sharif should not be taken to be a committed democrat or a committed peacemaker but a political realist.

Just as a combination of circumstances brought him into the Lahore process so other conditions especially if they affect his own political fortunes could make him less amenable to reason. One of his options is to go along with the generals' gameplan, and try and minimise the political and international fallout, in the hope of turning the aggression to his own good account. His better option would be to realise that there can be no gains for Pakistan or himself from the Kargil misadventure.

Far from altering the LoC to Pakistan's advantage, the generals have led Pakistan into a reckless unwinnable operation. In doing so they have presented the world with abarbaric, out-of-control army, and a state in imminent danger of falling into political chaos. Can Pakistan ever free itself of its turbulent generals?