For a month, 125 intruders entrenched in bunkers spanning Tololing Ridge-Saddle-Hump-Point 4590-Point 5190 and overlooking the national highway at Drass had weathered infantry assaults and piecemeal artillery firing. With IAF strikes in the Drass sector not bringing the desired results, it was left to the infantry and artillery to give the first major breakthrough.

How difficult the task in this sector was can be gauged from the outcome of the assault the Grenadiers had launched on Tololing Ridge. ``For 150 minutes on the night of June 2, concentrated fire using all kinds of infantry weapons, ranging from anti-tank rocket launchers to mortars,was directed at the bunkers. Believing that the enemy must have been wiped out, the Grenadiers launched an assault under Lt Col R. Vishwanathan. At least 10 MMGs and UMGs opened up on them, killing Lt Col Vishwanathan and five other men. The troops withdrew, realising that an infantry assault without tremendous artillery fire support was suicidal,'' explained an Army officer.

Putting their heads together, senior officers drew up plans for a mammoth mountain artillery offensive that would ``soften'' the enemy for infantry assaults later.

The offensive was carried out over two nights. Before that the guns had fired a few rounds on the enemy bunkers to identify the targets. ``The plan was not to saturate a large area with artillery fire but ensure with precision fire that targets of the size of 400m x 400m would be so engaged that wherever intruders took shelter, they would be hit by shelling,'' said a field gunner.

Targets like Tololing Ridge and Point 4590 were divided into three-four zones and bombedfrom all sides by 20 batteries. The guns fired for about 10 minutes on Tololing Ridge from all sides, then shifted to Saddle for another 10-minute crunch and then turned to the next target. The Bofors alone fired over 600 rounds on those two eventful nights in the history of Indian artillery.

1971 veterans say this offensive was the biggest-ever. ``In 1971, the Army never had so much artillery. The Tololing artillery offensive was perhaps the biggest-ever artillery firing plan executed,'' opines a field commander. ``Fifty per cent of the success can be attributed to the Bofors gun,'' admits a senior infantry officer. The first broadside that night was launched with long-range Bofors and 130-mm field guns on Pakistani gun positions to neutralise them in what is termed `indirect firing' -- guns lob shells at unseen targets over physical obstacles. Then the Bofors' long muzzles were lowered and high-explosive shells fired like rifle bullets in the `direct-firing' mode at the bunkers illuminated by paraflares.

The intruders ran helter-skelter and took shelter in reverse slopes and crevices, a technique that had saved them from uni-directional Indian artillery fire. But this time the situation was different. ``160-mm and 120-mm mortars lobbed shells from a high trajectory. The higher the shell goes before falling, less the whistling sound it makes and takes the target by surprise,'' said a gunner.

But the intruders had radioed back for help and the Pakistani radars were zeroing onto the Indian guns. The Bofors used its `shoot and scoot' ability to good effect, firing a few rounds and then darting back on its auxiliary engine to evade the Pakistani fire. Multi-barrel rocket launchers mounted on trucks along with 105-mm and 130-mm field guns added to the deafening booms that shook the mountains.

Then the infantry withdrew from the shelling areas. ``The troops then mined the areas of withdrawal and took shelter behind rocks,'' said an infantry officer. The Bofors-led broadside was simply ``shattering''.The troops behind the rocks ducked as huge boulders went flying. The top of Point 4590 was blown off and lowered by a few metres. The snow covering the peaks turned into the colour of petrol by the excessive cordite. Though no Indian soldier was injured, the Pakistanis were less fortunate. ``The `sangars' (rock bunkers) were just blown off. The enemy was found the next morning dead in their sleeping bags. Either they were dead or wounded or so demoralised as to offer only a third of their resistance when the infantry launched an eight-directional assault later on those nights,'' said a senior artillery officer.