After the Kashmir campaign in 1948, the first major operation specifically in the Leh-Ladhakh region was Operation Meghdoot launched in April, 1984 to capture Siachen Glacier. Though Operation Meghdoot and Operation Vijay launched to throw out the infiltrators in Kargil are completely different in nature, there are some uncanny similarities. Both times the weather and surprise were the key elements. Pak plans to launch 3 North Light Infantry to capture Siachen in October, 1983 were thwarted by bad weather. The following summer, India successfully lunched Op Meghdoot. Then it was the Leh-based division which turned the tables onthe Gilgit-based Force Commander Northern Areas (FCNA). This time, our troops have been taken by surprise, at least for now.

"From the snow desert of Siachen Glacier, the focus has shifted to the jagged wastelands of Kargil - both materially useless but strategically exploitable," explained an officer.

The casualty figures of the month-old Op Vijay have already surpassed those of Op Meghdoot. During the operation at Siachen in April and the three month consolidation period till June, there were a total of 278 casualties. This included nine who died during the operation and 12 who went missing and were later reported having been buried under Gyongla avalanche. Since the enemy had been completely surprised, most casualties were weather related - maximum being on account of frost bite and chill blain.

In Op Vijay, which is in retaliation to Pak's intrusion, we lost till Saturday 170 men with 345 injured, against Pakistan's estimated dead of 356 dead and many more injured in intense battles on treacherousterrain.

The ongoing war has resulted in an unprecedented mobilisation of troops and weaponry on both sides in the Drass-Kargil-Batalik sector of J&K, threatening to spill over into a full-fledged war. The mobilisation appears to be aimed at preventing possible thrusts in new areas in the sector. The extent of mobilisation can be gauged from the fact that an area which was earlier held by 1000 troops now has 10 times that number.

Since appreciation of ground and surprise are key elements at such heights, the Pak troops armed mainly with a plethora of World War II vintage weapons and using `sangars' (structures made of rocks) have been able to give a hard time to our assaulting parties, even though they have the support of modern weapons. "The enemy's weapons may be ordinary but the commanding ground, which he holds, makes all the difference," said a Colonel.

A parallel with Operatio Meghdoot - even after 15 years - is ad-hocism. In 1984 troops from at least 21 different detachments, including eightinfantry battalions, were brought together to launch a surprise operation. Since except for Ladhakh Scouts we still have no dedicated force for operations in such an area, for Op Vijay too troops from all over the Army have been inducted. Most of the troops are still getting used to the terrain and rarified air. While the Ladhakh Scouts, who are from the adjoining areas, and the soldiers hailing from hills had instant success, many others, displayed courage but not all met with success in their missions. Said an officer: "Mere chutzpah is not enough, for you are required to move up stealthily, from boulder to boulder towards fortified positions."

Officers admit that they had never prepared for a full scale war in this area, with the limitation of not crossing the Line of Control (LOC). As the assaulting Indian troops close in on the enemy positions, they are often handicapped by the lack of area support weapons like artillery and aircraft for fear of casualties from friendly fire.

Though the attritionrate in terms of men and material is very high, there is a material difference. While India has lost a number of officers, all Pak casualties from its Army are either jawans, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) or junior commissioned officers (JCOs), besides the irregulars. The Indian list of casualties shows that the Indian junior leaders are leading from the front.

Though no estimates are yet available, the four-week long nightmare has been a heavy drain on the depleting Indian ammunition stocks. It is calculated that nearly 60,000 artillery shells have already been fired in the battle. Since the battle appears to be more protracted than initially calculated, the artillery field commanders are being advised restraint in firing the Bofors gun, each shell of which is reportedly worth between Rs 35,000 to Rs 60,000. On the Pak side, since there is no township immediately behind the LOC, the collateral damage to civilian targets is not heavy. But there are reports of Skardu hospitals teeming with injuredinfiltrators and their supporters due to artillery pounding.

It is certain that even when the infiltrators have been thrown out of the area, the drain on the exchequer will continue to be heavy. The area, which was thinly held earlier, will have to have more troops. Besides, numerous key posts at heights of 15,000 to 17,000 feet will need to be manned even in winter months.