There is no reason for the Vajpayee government to sound defensive about responding to Niaz Naik's so-called private initiative. No harm is done by listening to what emissaries like him have to say. Back-channel diplomacy which allows for exploratory and tentative ideas to be thrown up has proved useful in contexts where new ground needs to be broken away from political pressures. Of course, given the way Pakistan's internal politics work, it is extremely difficult to assess a private emissary's exact status. From the fact that Atal Behari Vajpayee received Naik and that Naik's cover was blown by interested parties in Islamabad, the presumption is that he was authorised by Nawaz Sharif. Naik has also since revealed that he proposed talks between the directors of military operations of the two countries to work out how a ``so-called withdrawal'' from Kargil can be scheduled. This is open to positive and negative interpretations. Sharif may be exploring a low-key exit from Kargil or it may be a diversionarytactic and bid for a ceasefire and so on.Whether or not the Naik track amounts to a genuine proposal, one thing is obvious. The situation on the ground in Kargil where the Indian army is steadily retrieving one post after another and the general drift of G-8 statements have both pushed a negotiated withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Kargil further up the agenda. The terms and conditions of such a withdrawal are very germane to a resolution of the conflict and the issue will be raised in one fashion or another by Pakistani quarters or others on their behalf. The Indian public is not enlightened about possibilities on the diplomatic front by the series of reactive statements which the Vajpayee government has been issuing. If there is even the slightest prospect of a negotiated withdrawal of Pakistani forces, domestic public opinion needs to be properly prepared for it. Government spokespersons have not gone beyond reiterating the taboos: no ceasefire, no safe passage, no cessation of military operations, nodialogue until all Pakistani forces have been withdrawn, and no international mediation. How are the people expected to reconcile these taboos with what they learn from the media of diplomatic moves? How are public perceptions to be brought into line with new possibilities unless the government starts spelling things out better?
The objective in Kargil, as has been said, is to vacate aggression and recover all Indian territory. All the rest is military, political and diplomatic tactics. But in achieving the basic objective of throwing out the intruders, it is incumbent on the government to simultaneously ensure there will be no repetition of reckless Pakistani action on the LoC. It is known that the Indian army is making plans to secure the border against future incursions, plans which involve high costs in manpower and equipment. Other lower cost parallel measures to secure the LoC must be considered and put in place as well. Therefore, if and when a withdrawal of Pakistani forces is discussed it shouldbe on the basis of binding commitments from Islamabad to respect the LoC as laid down in the 1972 Simla protocols and maps.
Copyright © 1999 Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd.