In fact, there are now indications of mounting pressure on India to allow British carrier to increase its capacity and frequency to India's four metros Delhi, Calcutta, Mumbai and Chennai and add new destination like Ahmedabad in its route. The Germans too are trying hard to increase its operations between Frankfurt and the three Indian destinations of Mumbai, Delhi and Chennai. Lufthansa's fourth Indian target now is Bangalore. The real beauty of this entire spectrum, however, is that the Europe-India sector is now more favourably titled towards the European carriers. Germany, UK and Italy, comparedto India, are small countries with big airlines; whereas India is a big country with a small airline and multiple destination. Clearly, therefore, it is inherently `disadvantage India'. It is India's four metros for the foreigners versus one each of Italy's Rome, Germany's Frankfurt, and at best two of UK (London and Manchester). Seen from another angle, India has little chance to have access to any other hub of these three countries; but Europeans have all the chance to make deep inroads into Bangalore, Hyderabad and Ahmedabad. International aviation for India starts with a handicap.

This handicap, however, could have been minimised with a constructive perspective planning to look into the future. The key to Indian aviation's growth lies in the constructive exploitation of the profitable market sectors and `synergy' of the two national and international carriers -- Indian Airlines and Air India. As things stand today, Air India's withdrawal from Europe must be filled up by Indian Airlines which has bothcapability and expertise to operate in international routes.

Going back to Air India's post withdrawal average seat load factor scenario, one finds that both European and American carriers have had a good seat load factor. Thus, in May 1999, British Airways had 63.4 per cent in Delhi and 86. 2 per cent average seat load factor in Mumbai. Correspondingly, Lufthansa's figure for Mumbai and Delhi was 78.3 and 84.8 per cent. Air France too had 88.7 and 89.8 per cent for Delhi and Mumbai, and KLM's figure stood at 89.6 and 96.5 per cent respectively. America's North-West Airlines also had a consistent high of 92.5 and 92.8 per cent average seat load factor in Delhi and Mumbai in May, 1999. The figures, though not the sole indicator of the profitability and success of international air traffic, nonetheless points to the possibility of growth. And Air India certainly has not been able to catch up or compete with the carriers of the West.

The question is, will Air India be able to stage a comeback? The answer canbe both yes and no. The fundamental problems of Air India are its poor finance and operational constraint owing to limited number of healthy and young aircraft. Today Air India has withdrawn from Europe to concentrate on Middle East and South-East Asia. One sincerely wishes Air India to have a new fleet to go back to Europe and replenish its existing fleet for expanding its operations in South-East Asia and the Middle East.

Air India urgently requires fleet, and that should have been taken care of by the perspective planning personnel well in advance. What is being faced today in Indian civil aviation is a crisis of confidence which has afflicted airlines and the powers-that-be alike. Air India is shrinking, old aircraft are being grounded, surplus staff continue to be rostered, and credibility of a mighty democratic country is under avoidable scrutiny and suspicion. Why so? Because, there is a fear of chain reaction. The world knows that Air India (as well as Indian Airlines) would go for a new fleet. Itis also known as to who the manufactures are and what could be the possible combination of fleet acquisition. And yet the prospect of decision haunts all.

One here perforce points to a grim reality. In this imperfect world sermonising and ethical behaviour have little to do with multi-billion dollar deal between high technology manufacturers of the West and the consumers of the Third World. Any person, irrespective of his or her ideological affiliation, would be in a fool's paradise if he expects a behaviour of Ceaser's wife on the part of virtual monopolist western seller and a compulsive eastern buyer, running into dozen digit transaction value. Hence, the procrastination born out of fear and the reality of withdrawal of operation to grounding of old machine, all constitute part of a vicious circle. The result thereof is simple. The consumer, instead of being the king, becomes a sufferer. And that exactly is what is happening in Indian civil aviation market. With a shrinking choice of air carriers to andfrom India and reduced foreign destinations, there is every possibility of an increased fare, especially for those wishing to travel abroad from India.The other side of the picture, however, is the increased passenger load factor of western airlines and the corresponding increase in profit. The darker side for India is retarded growth, and less profit (at times no profit at all owing to withdrawal) and loss of an established market.The downdraft of the present Air India flight also appears to be compounded by two factors. The first an external factor of reduced fare resorted to by rival western airlines of Air India which make the tickets cheaper if bought abroad. However, the fare structure and yield management systems in foreign carriers are such that only a small percentage of the total aircraft capacity is sold at heavily discounted fares, with the rest of the capacity fetching good yield. In one stroke, therefore, the foreign airlines make both profit and lure passengers.

The second factor affectingAir India is the productivity link bonus scheme which has changed with times. In 1993, it was growth based, in 1994 it became volume based and in 1997-1998, it was revised to include both growth and volume indices. But the worst scene is the ex-UK-India sector where discounting is the heaviest. The result for Air India is simple. It receives a low fare and doles out a large bonus to both its employees and foreign service agents. In fact, no airline can afford to have a productivity link bonus payment policy where the payment to agents is not in ratio proportion of the earning of the airline. Air India needs to increase its yield for an enhanced revenue to match the mounting expenditure, a difficult but not ``beyond redemption'' a task. A healthy economics and a new fleet are the twin necessities not only for Air India but for India as a country.

The author is an alumunus of National Defence College of India