There is a perception that the Air Force could have entered the scene a little earlier and probably swung things much quicker...

The Army action started around early May. From the 15th to 20th there were several rounds of discussions on whether Air Force should take part or not. The Army had started feeling that air power should be used. Because the odds of the terrain were so overwhelmingly in favour of the intruders that even a small number of people with the cover of the boulders could actually keep at bay a much larger force.

Was the Air Force hesitant...

Therewas never a question of the IAF not entering the scene. But we needed political clearance. Because once the air element comes in, even if it is on our side of the LoC, it has a different dimension. We had to be prepared for an escalation. They (Pakistan) could have attacked our positions. So I told the Chiefs of Staff Committee that I require at least 24 hours to ensure that I can take pre-emptive measures for our airfields and industrial areas. We have the experience of 1965...

But there is still a perception that the Air Force was hesitant...

No hesitation at all. Generally speaking we don't advocate the use of air power for counter-surface operations. The urge to use air power as extended artillery is not the extreme way of doing things. Interdiction (of supply lines etc) is a far superior method of using air power. But interdiction at that point of time meant going across the LoC. We wanted to contain this operation and get back what we have lost.

What about the Pakistanis, was there noactivity on their side?

There were several occasions when they were flying F-16s on their side. But they were not prepared to attack. I think our air operations took them by surprise. My appreciation is that the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) would not under the present circumstances want to come into the fray. As far as Air Force-to-Air Force is concerned, we are stronger. I think Pakistan Air Force understands that.

How much of prior intelligence helped you, when you started the operations?

When we started off on May 26, our intelligence was not all that hot. No one perhaps can depend on human intelligence completely. Intelligence is not hard facts. Some of it is correct, some of it is speculation, some of it is downright wrong. So we had to a lot of photo reconnaissance. As the operation developed, we were able to identify the targets through reconnaissance. In all we attacked 25 targets, half a dozen were supply points. The attacks all over were telling.

Still there were initialsetbacks...

The first aircraft we lost, a Mig-27 (piloted by Fl Lt K. Nachiketa), was unfortunate. (We lost it because of) not carelessness, but inadequate precautions. The atmosphere is rarefied at a height of 35,000 ft. So firing a salvo of rockets causes that much more fumes. If you manouevre during that time, air flow pattern changes. He (Nachiketa) had a flame out.

By the time he could switch on again, it was too late. He had to eject. There is no question of making a scapegoat out of him. But you have to realise that when you are operating at above 5 km, certain precautions have to be taken. He kept orbiting for afew minutes looking around for the target. When he found it he went away to return for a second time and strike. Then he went down. Squardon Leader Ajay Ahuja searched for him for 20 minutes. He must have descended also, and came within the firing range of a Stinger. Next day, we lost a helicopter. But we were not taken aback, We knew what to do. And we had to make sure that wecontrolled the guys.

What lessons have you learnt in terms of tactic, terrain and technology?

Initially, we went in with rockets and cannons. We attacked effectively for three days to keep them (the intruders) heads down. But it wasn't enough to push them back. We realised that. The effect of rockets is localised. Like on a bunker, if you hit it you neutralise it, if you miss it by 25 yards there is little damage. A bomb is different: the shrapnel effect is much wider, even if you miss the target by 100 yards. You must remember that the most important part of airpower is brainpower.

How much of reorientation had to be done?

There was no classical land offensive. There was a never a broad frontage of 60-80 km. We had to attack point by point. But in a way it was a very easy operation. The only thing is that effectiveness of the air weapons was limited. We have probably used more than that was needed.

Why did the Mirage-2000 come into the picture late (mid-June)?

When troopsmove closer to the objective you have to make sure that there is no damage to them during attacks. Conventional attacks may result in errors of up to 100 to 200 yards. To make sure it didn't happen we used Mirages. A Mirage's Nav(igation)-Attack system is far superior.

Yet, don't you agree the Mirage made the difference?

(Hesitates )...Bomb per Bomb they probably they were more effective. But the others (in the Mig-series aircraft) put in far more effort. There is no doubt that the accuracy of a Mirage is greater. It is a superior aircraft. If you ask me what do I want, and if you give all Mirage 2000s, I will grab them.

What about using helicopter gunships again?

We will use them when they are required. Like for a taking out a strong bunker. And there are ways to avoid Stingers. This time, we have been able to use Mirages for pin-point targets. But if there is a full-scale war, a Mirage has to function as air defence escort, electronic surveillance and strikes. Helicopters then have tobe used. You cannot fight a war without attrition. But you have to keep the attrition manageable. This is what a commander is supposed to do. You can't sacrifice a pawn to get a queen. I would rather sacrifice a pawn to get a queen.