Highly-placed sources in the Army said the Commandant of the School of Counter-Insurgency, Khrew, in South Kashmir, Col KC Tyagi, was heading the probe team which would interact with all the formations deployed in the Kargil sector. The team had already completed the preliminary findings of the field probe. ``The scope of the probe embraces not only the factors that led to the intrusion going undetected but also the intelligence and operational failures in the first few weeks of the battle,'' a Brigadier deployed in the Kargil battlefield said.

But apprehension is rife in the Army - especially among the formations that bore the brunt of the battle and are being deployed to man the icy heights from Mushkoh to Turtuk - over the findings of the probe not translating into action against seniorofficers responsible for the Kargil fiasco.

``A concerted bid seems underway to pacify and silence even those officers who have been indicted. Brig Surinder Singh, Commander of the 121 (Independent) Infantry Brigade at Kargil, was removed from combat command in June last and attached to the Srinagar HQs of the 15 Corps. But he was given a good posting as Sub-Area Commander, Secunderabad, after he started to furnish written evidence that also indicted senior officers of the Leh-headquartered 3 Infantry Division,'' highly-placed sources in the Army said.

But there seems little chance of action against senior officers, including those of the 3 Division, as the ruling party is not keen that the attention is focussed on the ``failure to detect the intrusion''. Under this political pressure, the Army's top brass, too, is keen to gloss over the failures.

A disgruntled Brig Singh had shown senior officers at the HQs, 15 Corps, written proof of his early warnings being ignored by the Leh-headquartered 3Division. ``In March last, Brig Singh decided to act on an IB report that warned of an incursion into the Kargil area in April by 350 irregulars from Pakistan's forward HQs in Olthingthang. He despatched a signal to the GOC, 3 Division, Maj Gen V.S. Budhwar, and the Col (General Staff) Avtar Singh asking for orders to move up and occupy the heights in March itself,'' sources said.

But the HQs 3 Division apparently saw little sense in the proposal and did not give the go-ahead for the move to the heights. However, the signal seems also an attempt by Brig Singh to save his skin. ``Brig Singh as Commander of an independent infantry brigade had sufficient room for taking the initiative and moving up troops if he was genuinely apprehensive. But all he did was to show some paperwork and distribute the responsibility in case of any fiasco later,'' said a senior officer at Kargil.

Official sources confirmed there was no move to sack any of the senior officers of the 3 Division. ``They will retain combat command.The maximum that they will suffer is that their future promotions will probably not go through. Col Avtar Singh is due for promotion to Brigadier as his Board is through but the Kargil fiasco has introduced an element of doubt over whether it will now go through,'' sources in the 3 Division said.

It is learnt that Brig Singh was removed from combat command not only because of the inability to detect the intrusion but because of the operational failure that followed in the first three weeks of the battle in May. ``Maj Gen Budhwar and Brig Singh literally pushed troops into battle in the Drass sector on very poor operational intelligence and tactics. Troops of the 1 Naga and 8 Sikh ran up heavy losses after they were told to climb the heights, catch by the scruff of the necks and bring down the `7-8 mujahideen' holed up there,'' an Infantry commander in the Drass sector said.