It was in April 1998 that the Prime Minister telephoned me to say that given my background in the Mizoram Accord, the government required my help for the Nagaland peace talks. This was followed by a government notification dated June 8, 1998, wherein I was accorded the position of a minister of state with its salary and perks.

The government officials were quite amazed when I wrote back saying that I would not accept any salary, car or even a telephone. The Home Ministry officials quoted the case of an officer who, while Home Secretary, created a post-retirement job for himselfwithout specifying any time limit. Even the Prime Minister's Office used to comment on the gentleman holding on to his bungalow, car and perks although there was no work for him after my appointment. I told them that these matters did not concern me because in any case, I was not interested in such facilities. The PMO, however, wanted the gentleman to move out because there was no work for him and he was busy planting stories about the imminent failure of the peace talks. I wish him all the best in the task now entrusted to him.

In June 1998, I was elected to the Rajya Sabha and continued my work for the peace talks. In July/August 1998, the ceasefire was extended for a period of one year whereas all previous extensions were for just three months. We had talks in Bangkok, Zurich and Paris. We met twice in Amsterdam.

I arranged the NSCN leaders' meeting with the Prime Minister in Paris on September 30, 1998. After that I told the NSCN leaders that I would discuss only substantive issues because that alonecould lead to an early solution to the Nagaland problem. I have seen in the past that people who get post-retirement appointments wish to prolong the dialogue because they are interested only in their perks. My mission was different. I was not working for such petty gains.

I did not want to repeat the historical blunder we made by not negotiating with Phizo, the tallest Naga leader. The traditional school of thought is to wear out the underground leadership or divide its ranks. I do not believe in this. My view is that you should strengthen the leadership so that it can sell an accord to its cadres.

If you weaken a leadership or try to divide its ranks, you can never make an accord successful because one of the groups will reject it and go underground. We hae seen that many times, the last case being the Punjab Accord. In contrast is the case of Mizoram, where Laldenga could bring all the 700 rebels overground. It is only because of this that we have a lasting peace in Mizoram. Today, we have Laldenga'ssecond-in-command as the Chief Minister and his army chief as the Home Minister.

In Nagaland, my brief was limited. I was to talk only to the NSCN(IM) faction. But that was not in my hands. The NSCN(IM) leadership today are in their late sixties. I would not like to wear out that leadership. It would be most unfortunate because their second-line leadership are in their mid-forties. If we miss this chance, we will have violence in Nagaland for two more decades.

The NSCN leadership agreed to discuss substantive issues, which we did during our last meeting in Amsterdam. The NSCN stand is hard. Their language is even harsher. Yet that should not demoralise us. In the initial rounds on substantive issues, the underground leadership always has to adopt a tough stance, otherwise they are disowned and discredited by their underground cadres. The present attitude of the NSCN is also a result of the fact that we made some mistakes in the past. We agreed to the word `ceasefire' whereas this should have been`cessation of hostilities'.

All this time, I kept domestic politics at bay as this was a negotiation on behalf of the country. Unfortunately, the PM's House thought differently. In October 1998, it started a sinister campaign against me and my family, planting stories denigrating us. Every single story was traced back to the PM's House. Such things never remain secret. They thought this would not reach us. What should I call this? Nothing but immaturity. Facts have their own speed. They take a little time but do manage to reach the concerned persons.

Frankly speaking, I am not the sort to take these things lying down and my socialist credentials would confirm this. I fought the Emergency as George Fernandes's lawyer in the Baroda dynamite case. I stood by Laldenga when he was detained by Morarji Desai in 1979 and worked for peace in Mizoram for seven long years. It is not in my nature to accept this sort of behaviour.

I restrained myself for a good six months. They thought I was weak or timid andcontinued their malicious campaign without a break. In March, I thought enough was enough. I decided to resign from my appointment as the Government of India's representative. I met Shri Brajesh Mishra, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, and handed over my resignation dated March 22, 1999. I told him that the responsibility I was discharging required credibility but the kind of campaign the PM's House had launched against me was diluting my authority. They thought they were destroying me but in the process the cause was also being damaged.

The meeting with the NSCN leaders was to take place only three days later. He requested me to attend that meeting. I went to Amsterdam for the meeting and reported back to the government. My resignation dated March 22, 1999, remained pending with the Prime Minister.

I pressed this resignation again on July 16, 1999, by writing a letter to the Prime Minister. By then I had come to the conclusion that it was not advisable to represent this Prime Minister in anegotiation of this nature.

He has no perception of the problems of the Northeast. This was a negotiation with an underground group, where credibility was crucially important. You should never go back on your word. Unfortunately, this Prime Minister has no respect for his word. At the same time, I did not want to destroy my credibility. So I decided to dissociate myself and wrote to him on July 16, 1999, pressing for my resignation, dated March 22, 1999, which was accepted only on July 19, 1999.

If the PMO desires, I shall elaborate further, for which only they will be responsible.

If my resignation was described as what it was, I would never have said a word about the negotiations or its dramatis personae. You have given me so much of pain and agony. I suffered in silence for over 10 months but never said a word. I gave the 20 best years of my life for peace in the Northeast.

I worked for these negotiations day and night without any hope of return or reward. But you describe my resignation asremoval. Is this the reward you give me for 20 years of my work? You cannot disgrace my lifetime's work in this manner.

I hope the Prime Minister's admirers will now correct themselves and not describe my `resignation' as `sacking' or `removal'.