This changing profile of the terrorist in the Valley has introduced a new element of daring and sensationalism in attacks on civilian and army targets, making it all the more urgent and imperative for the security forces to re-assess their intelligence network and stay half a step ahead of the militants. The immediate impulses for the militants and their network across the borders are evident: to boost morale after Kargil, to cause disruptions in the gr-eat Indian electoral bandwagon and to choreogr-aph popular discontent over a never-ending cycle of violence. Hence, the volatile mix of soft and military targets being attacked. Therein lies the challenge for the security forces and the local administration alike. As they proceed with counter- militancy operations, as they attempt to weed out an estimated 1,000 foreign mercenaries from the state, the local fallout has to be painstakingly managed. Nothing suits themilitants' designs better than innocent lives lost in the crossfire. Aggression and provocation will have to be countered with determination, vigilance and restraint if the gains of the last few years, the hard fought for normalcy in the Valley, are not to be frittered away.

Yet, the battle extends beyond Indian territory, it cannot be fought without a diplomatic impetus. As Islamabad, eager to end a diplomatic isolation it is little accustomed to, makes periodic noises about a return to the Lahore process, New Delhi cannot afford to lose sight of cross-border terrorism as one of the key negotiating coordinates. The Pakistani prime minister should have no objection to that if he was indeed serious when he asked his people just a month ago: ``For how long will we snatch food from our people to buy guns?'' Those guns may have fallen somewhat silent in Kargil, but they are booming across the Valley. Guns which have left more than 60 dead in the first week of August alone. It is time they are incapacitated andlaw and order reestablished.