In 1947-48, India was still reeling under the pains of the Partition when Pakistan launched its audacious campaign in Kashmir. But for a brilliant rearguard action by the Indian Army, not only the Kashmir Valley but even the entire area from Zojila to Leh would have been lost to Pakistan. Since Pakistan managed to grab some parts of Kashmir, including Muzaffarabad, Gilgit and Skardu, it has dared to launch repeated excursions into Kashmir.

In almost every previous attempt, the modus operandi was the same; send in irregulars to infiltrate and then follow it up with military intervention. This time, the Pak generals were more intrepid and sent in army regulars disguised as `mujahideens' in the first stage itself.

This may well herald greater `Islamisation' of the Pak army, a process which firstgot a fillip during President Zia's time. Increasing ideological nexus between Pakistan's regular army and Islamic militants could in the long run erode its discipline and ethos.

It is apparent that Pakistan has not learnt any lessens. It has conveniently overlooked the well-known military doctrine that an offensive thrust will misfire unless backed by a tenable strategy and a thorough understanding of the opponent's response.

The manner in which the 1965 war was triggered also indicates sheer overconfidence of the Pak Army. After sending in infiltrators, it launched operations in the Kashmir Valley. When its plans in Kashmir came to a naught and its troops started losing territory and even Muzaffarabad (capital of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir) was threatened, it launched Operation Grand Slam and attacked the Chhamb area near Jammu.

It thought that this would force India to ease pressure against its formations engaged in `liberating' Kashmir. By launching Operation Grand Slam, Pakistan obviously expectedIndia to play by its rules. Even after it attacked Chhamb, Pakistan fooled itself into believing that India would limit the war to Kashmir.

It was only when Indian troops moved to retaliate in the Sialkot and Lahore sectors that the reality dawned on the Pak generals. Now while planning the Kargil venture, Pakistan did not expect the full blooded Indian riposte in the manner in which it came.

Even in 1971, Pakistan's attempt to first suppress the people in East Pakistan and then open the western theatre to ease pressure on its eastern flank proved to be a fatal miscalculation.

Kargil intrusion is only the latest example of the grandiose thinking in the GHQ in Rawalpindi, the name by which the Pakistan military establishment is known. In 1965, well before the war with India began, Pakistan planned an impossible operation by its newly created Special Services Group (SSG).

The plan envisaged air dropping SSG men to attack Indian airfields deep inside Indian territory. Finally after four months oftraining, three such attempts were made on Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara airfields, just before the 1965 war. Each party which consisted of about 60 men was dropped in the vicinity of the airfields. The operation was an absolute disaster and most of the raiding parties were either intercepted by the security forces or caught and beaten up by alert villagers.

It is surprising that such an operation, with only an outside chance of success, was executed. The Pak paratroopers, using old maps, unfamiliar with the terrain, carrying limited ammunition were launched deep inside Indian territory with no back-up support. They had no alternative plans, should the main mission fail.

However, the fact that none in the raiding parties opted out speaks volumes for their commitment. This was true even at Kargil. According to reports emanating from the troops who took part in the operation, most in the enemy bands fought bravely even in the face of heavy bombardment from the air and galling artillery fire. This, despitehaving been virtually abandoned atop rocky peaks with little chances of survival.

Valour of its soldiers apart, Pakistan does not seem to be learning from experience, its own and others. Undoubtedly, militarily even the Kargil stratagem was bold and caught us off guard. Chivalry in war is the most effective weapon to weaken the enemy's will to resist and this is what the Indian Army resorted to. Luckily, having achieved the initial surprise in the operation, the Pak plan fell flat. Whether this was due to inadequate follow-up planning or its field commanders having been restrained for fear of a full-fledged war is not known, as yet.

Indian planners dread at the prospects of an alternativ scenario in which Pakistan had not buckled so soon. Had the Pakistan Air Force and artillery openly joined the duel on the plea that its areas were being shelled, the whole battle scenario would have been different. There is no doubt that in the final analysis, India would still have prevailed but the cost both in termsof manpower and equipment would have very high.

One common characteristic which appears to have shaped Pakistan's military strategy in all its flare-ups with India is a fixed notion of India being a cleaving, teetering nation, waiting to keel over. Lack of a proper prognosis was the hallmark of its Kargil misadventure.