However, these moves are a halfway-house. Securing Kargil is important, but it should not cloud our strategic thinking, for the enemy cannot be so naive as to venture yet again into the same tract. The broader issues need to be addressed for, as the old Chinese saying has it, `He who excels at resolving difficulties does so before they arise. He who excels in conquering his enemies triumphs before threats materialise.'

The intrusions in Kargil reinforce the long-felt need to make doctrinal changes in the national security mechanism, so that any transgression of the borders are dealt with more effectively and without ambivalence. The fact that the soldiershave redeemed our izzat in Kargil should not blind the government to the need for a such a mechanism in the long haul ahead.

Unfortunately, despite previous reverses, no heed was paid to the need for a viable deterrent. The Kargil battles are a grim reminder of actions like Nam Ka Chu against the Chinese in 1962, which too made chilling reading. During the last few years, there has been some talk of the need for an animated defence policy, but constant political instability at the Centre and continuing low intensity war in Jammu and Kashmir appear to have deflected the government's focus.

The Subrahmanyam Committee has been asked to recommend measures to safeguard national security against such armed intrusions. One hopes that its recommendations don't meet the same fate as that of earlier committees.

Since there is talk of intelligence failure, the Subrahmanyam Committee is bound to take a critical look at the functioning of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and go into the need for a dedicatedDefence Intelligence Agency like in the US. The present JIC, which consists of representatives of the Ministries of Defence, External Affairs and Home, besides the Intelligence Bureau, RAW, Military, Naval and Air Force Intelligence with special invitees from the CRPF and the BSF, lacks accountability.

An intelligence failure could prove costly, but what is even more grave is the lack of a proper security doctrine. India has no written document enunciating its defence policy and the statements of successive governments before Parliamentary committees throw little light on our security doctrine.

These `guidelines' make only two broad points. One, that the defence of the national territory over land, sea and air encompassing among others the inviolability of our land borders, island territories, offshore assets and our maritime trade routes is to be ensured. Two, though India's objective is not to influence, interfere or dominate the region with military strength, it will prevent the destabilisation of itsneighbourhood.

Had the policy been more forthright, without soundng belligerent, non-issues like whether to cross the Line of Control wouldn't have distracted military commanders in Kargil. It should be made clear that "in case of a unilateral attempt to alter the borders and unduly influence or destabilise the region, India will retaliate militarily or otherwise in the place, time and manner of its choosing." Such lucidity would deter Pakistan from fomenting trouble.

Perhaps, with such an explicit policy, the need to plug each and every gap on the border, as is being done in Kargil now, will not arise.

Even the limited action in Kargil underlined the need for having an effective higher defence organisation. It is common knowledge that even at the height of the Kargil war, there was friction between the Ministry of Defence and the services headquarters over issues ranging from inadequate equipment to media briefings. A senior service officer was heard ruing the fact that even when troops were dying inKargil, certain people in the MOD were trying to score brownie points.

It is no secret that Army and Air Force commanders had varying perceptions of the use of air power in Kargil. Fortunately, the Pakistani Air Force did not join battle, or the differences may have been sharper. Weapons systems like medium and long range missiles, which are of utility to both the Army and the Air Force, further underline the need for a workable higher defence organisation.

In India, the service headquarters function outside the framework of the government (and inter-act with it through the Ministry of Defence). In recent months, the Ministry of Defence's oft-repeated stand that the present system had been working satisfactorily, was belied more than once.

The higher defence organisation should be revamped, making the service headquarters a part of the Defence Ministry. Though the kind of organisation we adopt should be specific to our requirements, we could draw some cue from countries like the UK and Australia (whichfollow the Chief of Defence Staff system) and the US (which follows the Joint Chiefs of Staff system). The idea is to enable direct interaction between the government and the three services and also expedite decision-making during crises. On whether such an organisation should be headed by the Army chief or the service chiefs in rotation, should depend on the National Security Council, threat perception.

Over the years, the lack of a proper higher defence organisation has forced many a service Chief to devise his own methods to get around the bureaucratic system. One former Chief was known to keep his South Block office well stocked with Scotch to indulge a minister. Incidentally, last year was not the first time that the three service Chiefs jointly complained to the Defence Minister against the Defence Secretary. They had lodged a similar protest against another Defence Secretary a few years ago.

A higher defence organisation is also important because we may yet again end up with a hung Parliament and ashaky coalition government. We would need to be able to safeguard the nation's security interests formulated by general consensus. Such an organisation would also shape support institutions like the National Security Council and the Directorate General of Defence Planning Staff.

The role of this body, which assists the Chiefs of Staffs Committee on important matters including periodic threat assessments, would change with the formulation of a higher defence organisation. With most DPS's having tenures of less than one year, this institution has now lapsed into an unexciting posting for officers of higher ranks.

Kargil now and the Bhagwat episode earlier also brought home the fact that institutions like the Chiefs of Staffs Committee (headed by the senior-most service Chief) is of merely ceremonial value, with little say in important inter-service matters.