Releasing the national nuclear doctrine here on Tuesday, India's first such public paper, National Security Advisor and Principal Secretary Brajesh Mishra claimed that the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides of the India-Pakistan border had actually ``deterred the escalation of the Kargil conflict.''

Admitting that ``of course we were surprised in Kargil, and shouldn't be in the future,'' Mishra said New Delhi should be in a position to retaliate if nuclear weapons were used against India. He refused, however, to give details about the command and control structure, or the designated civilian successors to the PM who would have control over the nuclear button, citing reasons ofsecurity.

It seems though that New Delhi has finally come around to abandoning its ``time-bound disarmament'' mantra, that was first put into place by the Rajiv Gandhi government in 1988. The first body blow to the mantra was given by the nuclear tests last year; today's doctrine cushions that blow by coupling the general objective of disarmament with the much more realistic one of ``arms control.''

The draft paper, nearly 18 months after the Pokharan tests, comes on the eve of the election. The collection of general principles on national security that have over the last year been enunciated by none other than the PM in Parliament, now seem to have been transmuted into a weapon on the eve of the election campaign.

But the very fact that the 27-member National Security Advisory Board, whose nuclear ideologies often radically differ from the other, have achieved this consensual doctrine is an exercise that speaks for itself.

Official sources said the key difference between India's nuclear doctrine andthat of the western powers (the US, France, UK and Russia) is that the latter are expressly sworn to a first strike. India and China, on the other hand, both abjure first use, but interestingly, besides the UK, no other country's doctrine has been as transparent in the description of its principles.

The sources pointed out that this draft paper will, after the debate it engenders, be reformulated into an operational, secret component and a public component. The former will contain details like the size of the nuclear arsenal, where the nukes will be deployed as well as the nature of the response.

The public component will likely be an elaboration of the elements already contained in today's draft : the policy of ``retaliation only'', sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces which are based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets (including, possibly, a nuclear submarine), their credibility (the adversary must know that India has the will and theability to use n-weapons), their effectiveness and survivability. And besides, the development of an appropriate disaster control system.

Mishra refused to comment on the government's mind on the CTBT, saying such a decision could only be taken after the elections, and that in any case a political decision was in its nature distinct from the nuclear doctrine.

He insisted that though India would not carry out out any more nuclear tests, New Delhi would remain committed to carrying out research and development, such as sub-critical tests, on building its minimum and credible deterrent. Such tests, he pointed out, were clearly allowed under the rubric of the CTBT.

`Agni in arsenal soon'