Indian Express: Brig Singh kept seniors updated on what was needed in Kargil

The Indian Express

Return to Story Page
To print: Select File and then Print from your browser's menu

Brig Singh kept seniors updated on what was needed in Kargil

Kanwar Sandhu

NEW DELHI, SEPT 3: As Kargil Brigade Commander, Brig Surinder Singh certainly did not foresee the kind of intrusion by Pakistan that finally led to the battle last summer. But he did keep harping on the ``enhanced threat perception'' in Kargil and what he thought needed to be done. Not only in letters to his immediate superior, Major General V S Budhwar, GOC, 3 Infantry Division but also in briefings to several senior officers, including Army Chief General V P Malik; Northern Army Commander Lt Gen H M Khanna and the 15 Corps Commander, Lt Gen Krishen Pal.

While Army officers claim that these briefings were routine and were in no way linked to the final intrusion, documents in the Brigadier's June 28 appeal to the Chief show that he did apprise his seniors of his ``enhanced threat perception'' in the area.

BRIEFING THE CHIEF: A year ago, on August 25, 1998, the Kargil Brigade sent a draft brief to Major General Budhwar on the eve of Gen Malik's visit. This eight-page note lists 42 points in all andformed the basis of Brig Singh's briefing to Gen Malik. Its main points:

Pak had planned to ``push militants'' across the LoC by targeting the Srinagar-Leh highway, hitting Kargil and some forward posts. It had moved its 24 Sind battalion from Gilgit to Olthingthang and another battalion from Sialkote to Skardu.

25 heavy and five medium guns were inducted into the sector. M-198 (155 mm howitzer) had been moved into the sector. M-11 missiles were reported in the Deosai plains.

Kargil and the Srinagar-Leg highway were ``vulnerable'' from Twin Bumps and Bunker Ridge and Point 3420. Pakistan might be ``preparing an additional bunker on Point 4085.'' And that infiltration routes were available ``through Mushkoh Valley, from Doda side to Panigar, Yaldor and through nalas in forward defended localities.''

The Brigade asked for additional weapons and equipment including one Bofors regiment (battery already deployed); heavy mortars of the newer variety, gun-locating radars, remotely pilotedvehicle flight and air photo and satellite images.

The mutually agreed ban--by the DGMOs of both countries--on the use of artillery had a ``deleterious'' effect on Indian troops. So Pakistan was building bunkers which were out of the range of small arms. It was also using air-defence weapons which were not in the purview of the ban.

ARMY COMMANDER'S BRIEFING: According to Brig. Singh's representation, besides the Chief, several senior officers visited Kargil and were apprised of the ``enhanced threat.'' For example, ``tour notes'' on the visit of the Northern Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Khanna, to Kargil sent by HQ 3 Infantry Division to the Brigade (for record) on February 27, 1999 show that:

The Lt Gen was told of the ``phenomenon of remotely piloted vehicles and unidentified flying objects'' over the Brigade Headquarters for possible reconnaissance purposes. Brig. Singh asked for deployment of L-70 guns saying that the IGLAS missiles weren't effective. The notes state that the ArmyCommander didn't agree but directed that the Director General (Artillery) be approached to send an officer trained in RPVs to visit the Brigade sector for analysing the reported ``UFO/RPV phenomenon.''

The Brigade Commander also mentioned that Pakistan controlled the Kaksar-Kharbu loop and the Kaksar-Chhanningund road. And that a case for induction of an electronic warfare company in the Brigade Sector had been taken up with the Corps Headquarters.

Brig Singh also asked for the deployment of two 105-mm Indian Field Guns to interdict the Olthingthang-Bridman road and the Gultari axis across the LoC. The Army Commander directed that the request be examined and guns deployed accordingly.

During the Army Commander's visit, Brig. Surinder Singh mentioned that the Deputy Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen S S Mehta, had during his visit on September 13 and 14, 1998, agreed to look into certain issues, including the supply of VSAT terminals for effective communications with battalions, additionalflame-throwers, gun-locating radars, RPVs, a helicopter fight, 3-D maps of the brigade sector and latest satellite images and aerial photographs.

Earlier, the Army's Signal-Officer-in-Chief also visited the Kargil Brigade on July 10, 1998 when electronic warfare resources to intercept enemy communications were discussed. It is not known as to how much of what was asked for was made available to the Brigade Sector.

`Brig doesn't mention what Chief said'

An Army spokesman confirmed that the points mentioned in Brig Surinder Singh's representation were indeed raised during the briefing on August 29, 1998. But the representation, he said, does not mention certain critical observations made by the Chief himself.

For example, he found that despite repeated enemy artillery firing, the Brigade did not maintain a proper ``observation profile.'' Similarly, there was a decongestion of certain equipment and stores, exposing the same to enemy fire. The Chief also inquired during the briefing as to why Brig.Singh had not visited his forward posts despite having been in command for nearly two months.

An Army spokesman said that during the briefing, the Army Chief pointed out that certain items like RPVs and gun-locating radars that the Brigade Commander had demanded did not exist in the Indian Army's inventory and he would consider providing these when acquired.

Net Express

------------------------------------------------------------

This story was printed from Net Express located at http://www.expressindia.com. Net Express provides a portal to India, with news from The Indian Express and The Financial Express along with sites on travel and tourism, the entertainment industry, the power sector, the environment and much more.

------------------------------------------------------------