The `no first strike' commitment and the `no use' promise against a non-nuclear weapon state go well with the stated goal of global nuclear disarmament and India's reputation as a `soft-option' state. There are, however, some disturbing aspects about the viability of such a commitment.The doctrine says that India will pursue the policy of `retaliation only'.

Any nuclear attack on it and its armed forces would result in punitive retaliation and infliction of damage `unacceptable to the aggressor'.

Nuclear pundits call this `deterrence by punishment'. In reality, India is stating that it is ready for an `unacceptable damage' to itself first before it retaliates. Can we quantify that damage? Are we prepared to write off Mumbai orNew Delhi before we respond?

A `no first use'(NFU) commitment steals away the option of `launch under attack', which means a missile headed for its target in India has to explode before we can ascertain whether it carried a conventional or nuclear warhead. So, here is India willing to wait till it is nuked to confirm whether it has been nuked! Are we to retaliate in case our armed forces get nuked inside enemy territory? After all, the enemy is using the weapon in his own turf and in self-defence. What if an effective pre-emptive attack, with conventional arms, is made on our nuclear assets, thus affecting our capability for punitive retaliation?

Undoubtedly, there are some pay-offs in an NFU commitment. First, one can claim the moral high ground. Second, one doesn't have to constantly be on high alert. Chances of accidental attacks are reduced, the nuclear threshold is raised considerably and nerves are less frayed. One also has the luxury of waiting till the mushroom cloud is sighted to respond.

Thedoctrine says that India will maintain a `credible minimum deterrence'. Coupled with the NFU commitment and the concept of punitive retaliation, it implies that India intends to maintain an arsenal that can absorb a first (possibly a pre-emptive) strike and still be capable of delivering a punitive retaliatory strike.

It is not difficult to see how and why this familiar 50-year-old open-ended argument led to more than 30,000 nuclear warheads being stockpiled in the past between the USA and the erstwhile USSR. During the days of the Cold War, US strategists considered the elimination of 20-25 per cent Soviet population and destruction of 50 per cent of Soviet industry essential to qualify as a massive US retaliation. What will our yardstick be? In the case of a war involving nuclear exchange, are we to assume that there shall be a halt after the first strike and retaliation, or that the aggressor will not have plans for a second strike?

Hence, a credible minimum nuclear deterrence against an adversary willimply maintaining an arsenal which will survive that of the enemy's and help win a nuclear war. Yes, the concept is dynamic, endlessly changing depending on who is on the other side. Quantifying a `credible minimum' deterrence is easier said than done.

Indian nuclear forces will be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile missile launchers and sea-based assets (read nuclear submarines carrying nuclear-tipped missiles) to provide an effective, flexible and credible minimum deterrence. Logically, the land and air-based weapons will be dispersed across the length and breadth of the country for strategic reasons. Any realistic strategy will account for a certain degradation of these assets during the first or pre-emptive strike by an aggressor.

A study conducted and published in the US during the late 1980s reported that a high-yield device exploded about 500 km above the ground can generate an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) of the order of 50,000 volts over a radius of 2,500 km around the burst point which would becollected along any exposed conductor. Such an attack will not cause any blast and thermal or radiation effects on the ground below but it can produce a massive breakdown in the communications systems.

The complexities of this phenomenon and the difficulties in testing them in full scale make accurate assessments impossible. But it is certain that most of the land communication networks and military command control links will be affected and it will undermine our capacity to retaliate. This, in fact, is the most powerful incentive for a pre-emptive attack. And a high-altitude exo-atmospheric explosion may not even kill a bird on the ground.

The only realistic way to achieve a credible deterrence by assured massive retaliation is by safeguarding one's own nuclear weapons from a pre-emptive or first strike, i.e. through nuclear-tipped missiles carried on nuclear powered submarines. Nuclear submarines, due to their unique advantages, will be relatively immune to a pre-emptive strike or a subsequentcounter-retaliatory one on land.

Once at sea, they can remain practically undetected and deliver an attack with ease. The entire system will also be relatively immune to the intense pressure that the military commanders and political leaders will be subjected to in case of a nuclear exchange on land. Even if the majority of the nuclear assets on the land are destroyed in an effective pre-emptive strike, the aggressor can still be assured of a punishing retaliation if there are a dozen or two high-yield weapons on board a submarine. This is essential for credible deterrence.

It is rather meaningless for India to talk about a NFU commitment and an assured punitive retaliation if it doesn't master the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile capability. The submarines have to be built, the missiles have to be designed and a reliable command and control system installed. Finally, it all has to be integrated and its reliability proved. There are numerous lessons to be learnt. Also, a time-frame of 15-20 yearssounds more realistic. Till then India should stop fooling itself with its NFU stance, which may well turn out to be suicidal.

What India needs urgently is another Admiral Hyman Rickover, who was the father of the American N-submarine programme and was at the helm of the project for more than 20 years. His vision, talent for def ying red tape and longevity at the task were largely responsible for the success of that programme. India did have a desi version of Rickover in A.P.J. Abdul Kalam. We need one more, urgently. Till then, the NFU can wait.

The writer is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi