It is a categorical statement; no ifs and buts. What was shipped to Pakistan was not components or drawings but the complete short-range missile. The message is: China's violation of the missile technology control regime invites strict full-blown sanctions. The difference between this and earlier intelligence reports is that the latest one is de classified and the facts have now been made public.

That leaves the White House and the State Department with very little cover. For years, the administrations of George Bush and Bill Clinton, arguing that high standards of evidence had to be met before sanctions could be imposed, played down intelligence assessments on the transfer of banned missile technology toPakistan and chose only to slap China on the wrists.

The latest report adds nothing new to what was already known about the M-11 transfer. So why go public now? The best guess is that the intelligence community needs to demonstrate it is doing its job thoroughly. The Cox Committee report showed China probably acquired critical data about advanced US weapons because of failures down the line in intelligence and in weapons labs. That uproar came on the back of the uproar over China acquiring critical missile knowhow because of laxity in the US administration.

After all that, a lot of people will be trying to shut stable doors. The question now is, will bringing the M-11 issue into the public arena pressure the US administration into acting appropriately? In all probability, it will not. The worst that will happen is that it will be tougher for the administration to wriggle out of its responsibilities but wriggle it will.

There were signs of that already from the State Department whose spokesman agreed theM-11 could be a grave security issue but on the other hand it may not be one. The M-11 is ``playing the same old tune'' according to the Chinese. It is also small potatoes compared to the other contentious issues between Washington and Beijing today.

Among the far larger problems both capitals are trying to find a way around are NATO's bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, disagreements over China's entry into the WTO, stolen US weapon designs, Asian security programmes and Taiwan's ``intransigence''. When there is so much to do to bring the all-important US-China relationship back on to an even keel, conduct by one of them leading to instability in South Asia is not going to be given too much attention.

Whether the M-11 ends up as one more monument to superpower hypocrisy depends on members of the US Congress who have been very critical of the Clinton administration's policy of blind engagement with China. If those critics push for change and push for accountability, there may well be some movestowards imposing sanctions. But it is a long shot.