But it happened here when dozens of veteran former spooks - once big shots in the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Soviets' Komitet Gosudastvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB), Britain's MI6 (origin from Military Intellegince section 6) and Germany's Bundesnachrichtendienst - gathered in Berlin recently for a strange reunion.

While a host of amusing stories were told, old rivalries weren't forgotten as exchanges took place over the role of "the CIA, Berlin and the end of the cold war" at the former allied spy facility and listening post on the city's Teufelsberg (devil's mountain).

The spies clearly relished being able to speak freely, but often needled one another with claims that their particular post-war intelligence gathering was the best in terms of efficiency and reliability.

PeterSichel, a former CIA station chief in Berlin, recalled that friendly contacts which Western allied representatives built up with Russian officials in the aftermath of World War II, soon soured.

"Initially we would meet socially for drinks in Berlin but gradually the political climate got frostier," said Sichel, adding that Western officials soon found themselves having to redefine their intelligence gathering.

"It became increasingly important for us to keep an eye on troop movements in the East, which was no an easy task in the pre-satellite era," said Sichel, who added that "the fear we would be over-run and that at the end the whole of western Europe would be conquered was ever present".

Oleg Kalugin, a former KGB general chief of directorate, irritatedby claims that Western intelligence had proved more efficient and reliable than that of its Russian counterpart, both during and after World War II, said he'd corrected "misleading impressions" given at the Berlin conference.

"During the first Berlincrisis - the blockade in 1948-49 - the KGB had some 200 agents inside the United States, operating in every federal agency.

"We were aware of all the difficulties and problems within the US military and political establishment on the question of how to deal with the Berlin problem.

"Stalin was testing the West's resolve at the time. He thought maybe if we pressure them (the United States) a little they will abandon Berlin".