What happened in Kargil is no different from Pakistan's earlier infiltration bids in J&K. In fact, in Kargil, Pakistan was able to go a step further and consolidate its intrusive forces, thanks to the failure of our military planners to assess the threat perception correctly. But for the decisive military response that followed, this folly could have cost us dear.

Of late some efforts have been made to draw a distinction between infiltration, intrusion and invasion. These attempts in the context of the Kargil sector not only confound the issue but stem from an inadequate understanding of the ground situation in J&K. Most parts of Kashmir are suitablemainly for defence and are ill-suited for large-scale mobile operations by modern forces. In a lot of places direct fire is not possible due to thick vegetation and the nature of contours. Since the mountainous terrain fragments attack, the attacking party is invariably forced to move in small parties of less than platoon strength. It is only in valleys that company- and battalion-level attacks are possible. Since most such alleys in J&K are secured to the hilt, infiltration in thinly held areas would be the logical approach of any aggressor.

Sadly, our military planners have not learnt the lessons from Pakistan's earlier infiltration bids in J&K. It is now well established that in 1948 nearly 5,000 tribesmen, Afridis, Wazirs, Mashuds, and Swatis entered Muzaffarabad and Domel and captured both cities in one day. They then set off for Srinagar with some more joining the main body by coming over the Pir Panjal range. They were joined by some irregular formations like Azad Kashmir brigades, Gilgit Scouts,Zhob Militia and Chitral Scouts. The raiders who were accompanied by regular troops were contained after they had razed Baramulla and other nearby towns and were heading towards Srinagar.

In 1965 too, Pakistan had deployed a mix of regular and non-regular troops (non-regulars were referred to as `mujahids'). This was done right down to the platoon- and section-levels. Even further down in the Rann of Kutch area in Gujarat, the Pakistan army sought to recruit locals (Hurs) and at least 1000 of them were even reportedly armed to fight the Indian Army troops.

Operation Gibraltar launched by Pakistan in 1965 was basically an infiltration plan. It consisted of five self-contained columns, which were to further break up into smaller groups to infiltrate the ceasefire line (which was later converted into Line of Control in 1972). Certain groups were to operate along the ceasefire line attacking gun positions, who were to later join up with the five columns of Gibraltar force. Each of them had been givendifferent areas. Incidentally, one of them (Tariq force) was for Kargil-Sonamarg area. Once they were able to cut off vital road links, Pakistan would have gone in for the attack in Kashmir.

This time in Kargil, the Pakistan plan could not have been limited to cutting off the Srinagar-Leh highway. It was a part of a bigger plan, prepared over a few months and now timed with the political uncertainty and elections in India. There are indications, that having paralysed the Srinagar-Leh highway (which would effect winter stocking in Leh-Ladhakh), there would have been large-scale infiltration in the Kashmir Valley. The aim would have been to reduce the Indian authority in the Valley to paralytic helplessness. This would have been utilised by the Pakitan Army to effect mobilisation of its armed forces for the final kill.

Going by past experience, any conventional offensive by Pakistan across the LOC in J&K will be synchronised and preceded by infiltration in a planned manner. Since a full-scale war could beruinous in the wake of nuclearisation of the region, a viable counter-infiltration strategy should be devised. This could be done by a systematic study of the earlier Pakistani attempts.

The enemy designs can be thwarted by early detection of infiltrators. The plan to have aerial reconnaissance and deploy electronic sensors and other sophisticated equipment in the hill tracts for early warning will definitely help. In J&K some steps have been taken to strengthen the local police but this is apparently not enough. Since insurgency in J&K has come to stay, it is important to raise specialised army formations for the area. The troop composition of these formations could be a mix of locals and others. In the Kargil sector, for example, if more locals had formed a part of our security apparatus, a better inkling of what was happening across the border may have been possible. It is common knowledge that the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) battalions deployed by Pakistan on its side are made up mainly of troops fromnorthern areas of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, who have intimate knowledge of local topography.

In the initial phase of all operations, infiltrators are usually few in number. But since they can't succeed without local help, the best way to neutralise them would be to wean away the mass support.