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Mushirul Hasan
Tim Sebastin, of `Hard Talk' fame, needs a dressing down from his boss in London. Normally pleasant and gracious towards his guests, his tone and temper tend to change whenever he interviews third world personalities. He conducts an inquisition rather than a dialogue with them. This was illustrated on Wednesday, when he was talking to Hasan Sharif, son of the deposed Pakistani Prime Minister. He tried to extract a confession of sorts that the coup evoked support rather than condemnation, that his father presided over a massively corrupt empire, and that he himself lived like a prince in a rented Mayfair Garden flat that was paid for by two off-shore companies. Added to this was Hasan Sharif's own weak defence of his father's misconduct in public life.
The celebrated interviewer, using his vast experience and skills, managed to bludgeon a young student into submission.The problem with Tim Sebastin was that he did not address himself to the more fundamental issues of governance in Pakistan. Perhaps, he chosethe wrong person to talk to. Perhaps, he is not well informed about the ill effects of a fractured polity and the gravity of the economic crisis in Pakistan. If so, I would not blame him. In recent weeks, Pakistan watchers in India and elsewhere tend to focus more on the causes rather than the consequences of the military take-over. For me the key question is not the enormity of corruption in Pakistan (was it any less at any other time?), but the legitimacy of a military government and the future of democracy. Likewise the unmistakable unpopularity of Nawaz Sharif is not central to my concerns.
The real challenge is to explain how and why an elected government was removed with such ease. Some might say the predictable has happened. I am not quite sure if I agree. Military dictators have their own way, their own ambitions, and their own style of functioning. Whether in Pakistan or elsewhere, they are not in the habit of relinquishing power. I doubt if General Musharraf will prove to be an exception to thisrule. The early signals are disconcerting, though quite in keeping with the tradition pioneered by Yahya Khan and Zia-ul-Haq. Having usurped power from an elected government, he chose a site in Saudi Arabia to announce that the restoration of democracy might take as many as three years.
Whatever opposition parties might say at present, for fear of persecution or reprisals, they must know that the general's intentions are far from clear. If they are not alerted to this fact at the earliest, they may well bemoan Musharraf's reign as an epic tragedy. When their brief honeymoon with the existing regime is over, they may well regret their ill-advised decision not to defend democracy. For India, the choices are not so simple as they appear. For one, the general, emboldened by the short-lived support he has, may well turn out to be a hard nut to crack. Second, India's experience with previous generals has not been a happy one. We cannot forget the military aggression of Yahya Khan and his brutal repression of thepeople's movement in Bangladesh. We cannot ignore the fact that the recent unprovoked aggression in Kargil was also the handiwork of the military government.
Surely if this is Pakistan's army record, we cannot expect an entente cordiale with the Pakistan establishment in future. I suspect that once Pervez Musharraf tightens his grip, he may well decide to heighten anti-India sentiments to legitimise its authority among the people. If the past is a guide, we can expect this to happen sooner rather than later. Time and time again both military and civilian rulers have whipped up anti-Indian feelings to diffuse discontent and opposition ag -inst their authority. A wise general like Musharraf must know that this strategy paid off in the past. There is no reason why it should not work as long as he controls the levers of power.
It is nobody's case that civilian governments, starting with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, were friendly towards India. But this does not mean that we lend legitimacy to military rule. There canbe no doubt that the US will do business with the Pakistani general but not Saddam Husain, President of a beleaguered nation. It is also true that the IMF and the World Bank, having produced the familiar noises, will soon pour in their dollars to rescue Pakistan from bankruptcy. Equally, the Commonwealth, having occupied the high moral ground for a week after the coup, appears to have abdicated its commitment to democracy in Pakistan. This is what international diplomacy is all about.
This is what morality in politics amounts to. Still, if the international community's ambivalence towards this regime continues, the return of democracy in Pakistan may take much longer than expected. In the long run, this may not suit the freedom-loving countries of the West.If India wants to leave its imprint on the 21st century we must act differently. As the largest and one of the most successful democracies, we have a moral responsibility towards the restoration of democracy in our neigbouring country. The spirit of theLahore accord, though violated by Sharif and his generals, should continue to guide our relations with their successors. At the same time, our long-term interest lies in stable democratic governments in South Asia. There is merit in reiterating this point also because of the growing Taliban menace.
The last thing we want is to allow a bunch of misguided religious zealots to take advantage of political uncertainties in Pakistan, cross over our western borders, and stir up trouble in the already wounded Kashmir Valley. A democratic Pakistan al-one can act as a bulwark against the fundamentalist tide. I say this regardless of our experience with Zufiqar Ali Bhutto, his daughter, Benazir Bhutto, and Nawaz Sharif. When the night of the generals is over and the dawn of freedom arrives, the democratic forces in Pakistan will have to perform a Herculean task. They will have to ensure that no general would ever place an elected Prime Minister in custody, lock up Parliament, and suspend the constitution. For themoment, the political elites in Pakistan seem to have accepted the status quo. Even the more enlightened sections are resigned to their fate. This augurs ill for their own future. If they have a stake in democracy, they can ill-afford to give precedence to their personal or party preferences over established constitutional norms. Today, Nawaz Sharif is languishing in custody; tomorrow it could be the turn of their elected representatives.
Copyright © 1999 Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd.
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