In juxtaposition stands the philosophy of the profit-making (however meagre it maybe) Indian Airlines operating to 75 destinations (with 56 aircraft), 17 of which are foreign stations. As Indian Airlines wanted to grow, it proposed to the government to allow it to operate to Frankfurt, Rome and Manchester wherefrom the Indian flag had been withdrawn by the `Maharaja' carrier. Seen in broader perspective, Air India seems to be keen to make profit without operation and Indian Airlines wants to take the risky way to profit by expanding its operationswith increased load to the new ports. Is it not ironical. The international carrier shrinks to the territorial waters and the domestic carrier dreams to expand!

The serious point, therefore, is to examine the performance of Air India's route, fleet and economics in the recent past. First, the annual balance sheet, which shows that 1994-1995 is the last profitable year of Air India. The carrier's fleet modernisation programme, though a burning issue, too continues to be in the backburner, putting its fleet utilisation to its ultimate edge of human enterprise and machine's endurance. Thus, whereas in 1996, Air India had a fleet of 28 aircraft operating to 45 cities (including 10 Indian cities) in 1997 the number of operating stations came down to 39 and the aircraft availability to 26.

The downdraft of Air India continues. The number of operational aircraft in 1999 is 24 and the engineers face the nightmarish task of timely availability of the five Boeing 747-200 (each of which is more than 22 years oldwith a log of more than 50,000 cycles one cycle is one landing). Not surprisingly, therefore, with the downfall of aircraft availability the number theoretically though the June-October 1999 time table indicates Air India to be a global airlines with 45 destinations spanning over four continents of Asia, Europe, Africa and North America.

In reality, 11 of these are Indian airports and 10 are destinations which are indirect points of call of Air India, being served by Scandinavian Airlines to Copenhagen, Air France to Geneva, Air Mauritius to Port Luise (Mauritius), Asiana to Seoul, Austrian Airlines to Vienna, and Swiss Air to Zurich. Air India makes money through a small percentage share of seats offered by these foreign carriers.

Air India's direct operations are confined to 23 foreign destinations only (16 Asian, three European, two African and two American). And there lies the tragedy. Air India's present motive appears to be profit with curtailed operation and through seat sharing with foreignoperators, which is a negative and myopic way of doing airlines business.

That is the present reality of route, fleet and profit of Air India and the Maharaja's future prospect indeed appears bleak. Should then one sit back idle and be witness to the slow demise of an airline of 67 years of international standing? Certainly not. But how? Through a ``strategic partner''! Fine! But, who should or could be the ``strategic partner?'' Foreigner or Indian? Yes, why not Indian? Why not Indian Airlines? How? What is common between Air India and Indian Airlines?

Let the facts speak for themselves. The common factor starts with the 11 Indian airports where both Air India and Indian Airlines operate. There also are seven common foreign destinations for both Air India and Indian Airlines. These are Bahrain, Bangkok, Doha, Kuala Lumpur, Kuwait, Muscat and Singapore. Of the 17 foreign stations covered by Indian Airlines, nine are its exclusive domains, like Colombo, Dacca, Fujairah, Karachi, Kathmandu, Male, Sharjahand Yangon.

Similarly, of the 23 external stations, Air India is not challenged by Indian Airlines in 16 (nine Asian, three European, two African and two North American) points. Thus, point by point, whereas Air India covers 16 foreign airports, Indian Airlines does it at 10, the rest seven being common destinations. In other words, the two Indian carriers use 33 foreign destinations which is a gross under-utilisation of both capacity and frequency vis-a-vis the operational rights born out of mutually agreed bilateral air agreements in accordance with international relations, rights, convention and law. Clearly, therefore, India in international air routes is slow on performance and low in profit.

Air India and Indian Airlines, instead of a common operational strategy, seems to be cancelling each other out both in and outside the country. The best and the only way to come out of this policy of same side goal is the merger of the two for the emergence of a mega Indian carrier with (56+24) 80 aircraft. Agradual and calculated redeployment of fleet, rationalisation of the route, avoidance of duplicity on low profitable stations and strengthening of the overall economic viability and operational range, capacity and utility appear a possibility. In one stroke, the competition and confrontation between two Indian carriers will turn into harmonious cooperation pushing the foreign carriers to go on the defence.

In matters of fleet too, both Air India and Indian Airlines use only two brands. The only common exception, however, is the Airbus-300. Nevertheless there are the Boeing-737s, and Airbus 320 for the domestic and the Boeing 747-200, 300, 400 and the Airbus 310 for the flag carrier. A union, in one stroke also would improve ratio of old and new aircraft.

At present, 10 out of Air India's 24 aircraft and 26 out of 56 Indian Airlines aircraft are old fuel guzzlers. Under the new combination, 36 out of the 80 machines would be old. Some of the old machines then perhaps could also be used as freighters asis done world over to get the best economics out of used technology. All leading international players try to make money through cargo by deploying the uneconomic passenger aircraft.

Pending the proposed merger of the two Indian carriers, however, is the urgent need to counter the mega foreign carriers who have pushed the Indian Maharaja to despair. In fact, the western aerial Gullivers have already conquered the Indian Lilliput whose folly lies in transparent lack of unity of purpose. Hence the vacuum created by Air India's withdrawal from three European destinations of Rome, Manchester and Frankfurt need to be filled up by the Indian Airlines which is too willing to get back to an annual traffic right of 2,00,000 capacity (each way 10,000).

Indian Airlines proposes to do what Air India has failed to do by design, thereby making short-term profit for the institution, and inflicting long-term damage to the national flag's macro-economics, image and honour.

As the Maharaja has relinquished its primaryrole in the international arena, let the chota raja Indian Airlines fulfill the rights born out of bilateral air services agreement contracted between the sovereign nations of UK, Italy, Germany and India. Indian presence in foreign market is overdue. One way traffic of foreign airlines is reaching an unacceptable uneconomic level for India.

The author is an alumnus of the National Defence College of India