Breaking ice with Japan

Breaking ice with Japan
J N Dixit

External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh's visit to Tokyo in November was observed with interest in India. Contradictory conclusions have been reached about the results of his discussions with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and other leaders of Japan. A statement by the Japanese Ambassador in New Delhi on the eve of the visit, reiterating Japan's view that India should sign the CTBT, was viewed as a pressure tactic by segments of the Indian media and strategic establishment. But what the ambassador said was only what some Indian analysts were also advocating.

Mixed reactions to its outcome apart, the visit has to be evaluated in three contexts: first, the importance of Japan in the Indian foreign policy agenda; second, the recent critical phase through which Indo-Japanese relations have passed through; and, third, the basic orientations of Japan's foreign and security policies. Japan's political and economic significance in India's Asian policies hardly needs any overemphasis. Japan has been amajor partner in India's economic development and modernisation efforts.

Over the last decade, it has emerged as the foremost contributor to bilateral economic assistance to India, both in terms of investment and credits. Japan is a major contributor to important sectors of Indian industry (automobiles, electronics and telecommunications). It is an important player in the political sphere in South-East Asia, the Asia-Pacific region, and multilateral financial institutions (IMF, IBRD, and ADB). Japan is a leading influence at the WTO and the UN.

While these considerations have underpinned Indian policies towards Japan, Japan has, in more recent years, taken a more impatient and inflexible stand on issues of significance to India. In the initial stages of India's economic reforms in the early Nineties, Japan was a more insistent advocate of liberalisation of the Indian economy. It also put greater emphasis on political conditionalities related to non-proliferation, reduction in defence expenditure and soon for expanding economic relations. Distances also emerged when India undertook the futile exercise of competing with Japan for a non-permanent seat in the Security Council in the mid-90s, when all indications were that we could not succeed the Japanese candidate. The Indo-Japanese relations went into a downward spin after India's nuclear weapon tests in May 1998. Japan was the most strident critic of the tests, urging suspension of economic assistance, cutting down on economic relations and suggesting collective international punitive sanctions against India.

Japan was the most articulate among the G-7 countries criticising India in its post-Pokharan II meeting. The Indian reaction to Japan was negative, to signal that India would not succumb to pressure, where its vital interests were involved, even from a friendly and important country like Japan.

Official-level meetings on bilateral political and economic relations stood suspended. A meeting of the Aid India Consortium scheduled in Tokyo wascancelled. India and Japan became subject to an avoidably tense relationship. Some objectivity returned to Japanese attitudes by the winter of 1998.

The Japanese Government invited delegations from the Indian media and think-tanks to visit Japan. The message conveyed to these non-official Indian teams was that the Japanese reaction to the tests did not imply a specific antagonism towards India, but that it was a result of Japan's deep-seated convictions about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in the context of the Japanese experience in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was clarified that the Japanese had become restrictive only about official economic relations and not placed major restrictions on interaction between the private sectors of Japan and India. It was also indicated that Japan was seriously desirous of resuming official contacts with India. There has been a gradual thaw in Indo-Japanese relations since November 1998. This led to former Industries Minister Sikander Bakht's visit to Japan, followedby the resumption of official talks. Jaswant Singh's visit was the culmination of this process.

From the immediate results of the visit, two broad conclusions can be drawn. The first is the likelihood of the dialogue being resumed on political and security matters at a high level, in contrast to the breakdown in communications between the two countries over the last year. Secondly, subject to the pace and content of Indian economic liberalisation and reforms, there could be a gradual expansion in private sector economic interaction. There is no likelihood of Japan pulling back from the sanctions imposed on India due to the tests, unless India signs the CTBT and gives clear indications of becoming a party to the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty also. Japan is likely to follow US policies regarding the removal of sanctions with a delayed time gap. The prospects of India-Japan relations must necessarily be examined in the context of the overall orientations of Japanese foreign and security policies.

Inoverall terms, Japan desires international acknowledgement as a major economic and political power on the international stage, particularly in Asia. The major ingredients in Japan's policies to achieve this aim are: a stable and close relationship with the important power centres in Western Europe and North America; ensuring an equilibrium in relations with China and Russia, relations with whom have an undercurrent of tensions. While maintaining good relations with countries of South East Asia and the Pacific Region, Japan will remain committed to its security relationship with the US and retain its nuclear umbrella for its own security. At the global level, Japan would be a strong advocate of the generally accepted arms control and non-proliferation agenda.

As far as India is concerned, Japan's major worry is the nuclearisation of the South Asian subcontinent which confronts it with the predicament of dealing with three nuclear-weapon powers instead of one (not just China, but India and Pakistan also).Japanese stand on issues like Kashmir will remain impartial between India and Pakistan, while there are possibilities of Japan sharing India's concerns about cross-border terrorism and separatist subversion. The potential of Indo-Japanese cooperation is extensive given the complementarities between the Japanese and Indian economies, the Japanese capacities and the opportunities in the Indian market. The range and content of their relations will depend on the extent of India's economic liberalisation. A substantive working relationship with Jap-an is important for India in terms of the evolving strategic equations in the Asian region.

The historical and cultural relationship with Japan and a shared commitment to democratic institutions provide the basis for structuring a suitable relationship between the two countries, despite differences of opinion on important strategic and security issues. The endeavour should be to discern areas of agreement and expand cooperation in spheres of mutual benefit.