Act like a mature nation

Act like a mature nation

I was in the US when the hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane took place. The seven-day crisis attracted international media attention. An aspect of the coverage was that the interpretive comments, particularly in the visual media, were clinically detached and non-committal. There were references to daily developments but the hijackers were referred to as "militants from Kashmir, an area of dispute between Pakistan and India". There was no condemnation of the act of terrorism nor were there any critical references to those entities whose general backing was available to the hijackers.

There was a complete absence of emotion and hype which attends terrorist acts when citizens of the more powerful countries are affected. To me the Western media coverage reflected a deeper reality that while the world takes note of such events, the basic responsibility of dealing with them remains primarily with the affected country. Neither in terms of value judgments, nor in terms of operational support, should we expecteffective pressure on the terrorists and their supporting agencies from other governments. Dealing with challenges to our security is and will always be our responsibility.

It is in this context that one examines the implications of the hijacking and the manner in which we dealt with it. Factual details regarding the hijacking have been available to the public over the last three weeks. The manner in which our government tackled the problem has been the subject of acrimonious cogitation. The objective here is not to repeat the postmortem.The most significant policy orientation emerging from our handling of the crisis is that as a civil society, we attach the highest value to human lives, even if it has negative implications in terms of security policies and counter-terrorist actions. Secondly, it seems we do not have a clearly defined state policy on terrorist acts. Third, while being aware of Pakistan's long-term policy to foment terrorism, we are short of adopting a categorical and decisive postureagainst Pakistan.

The lessons to be learnt are obvious. While we have the organisational arrangements for dealing with such crises, much more has to be done to bring ourselves up to the mark for effective and timely counter-measures. We have an apex crisis management committee chaired by the cabinet secretary. We have specially trained manpower resources in the NSG and similar forces to cope with such events. We also have personnel trained in negotiating through terrorist situations.

There also exists procedural manuals, detailing action to be taken step by step. But whether it was the air-dropping of arms at Purulia or the recurrent terrorist violence in Kashmir, or this hijacking, sequential recalling of actions taken to deal with these events, clearly indicates compartmentalisation of responsibilities, shortcomings in coordination between different agencies and the consequent delayed response. That Pakistan-sponsored violence will increase, after the fiasco at Kargil, was a unanimous Intelligenceassessment. Why then did we not move on to a higher level of alertness and security deployment patterns? The need is to speculate on what remedial action we can take.

Foremost is the need to clearly define firm policy stances on negotiating with terrorists, when they are engaged in a violent operation. Like Israel and the US, we could take a decision not to negotiate or compromise with any category of terrorists. Secondly, crisis management procedures should be fine-tuned to ensure efficient coordination and quick response.

Third, we must negotiate and come to agreements with countries, particularly in our immediate region (except Pakistan), to enable our own security personnel to do the final security checks before passengers board our planes from points of origin in the neighbouring countries. We have to ensure a more alert, efficient security arrangement within our own country at airports in politically sensitive provinces.

Our special forces entrusted with the responsibility of counter-terroristoperations, should be deployed in a decentralised manner at sensitive and vulnerable points, with one or two central units kept in reserve at the relevant headquarters. Each of the units located at dispersed points should be provided with logistical and all other operational support for initial quick time response. It would be advisable for India to get assistance, advice and training for our personnel from countries with experience of being under constant terrorist pressure.

It is equally important to assess external reactions to the predicament we face and structure our approach to foreign governments in a realistic manner. A diplomatic and publicity campaign to have Pakistan declared a terrorist state is a futile exercise. While countries like the US were supportive and helped us with information and intelligence inputs during the hijacking, clear indications were given by most of the important countries that they are not inclined to declare Pakistan a terrorist state.

The alternative is simple. Weshould treat Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism and deal with it as such in a decisive and preemptive manner. We must simultaneously put the important powers and the international community in general, on notice that this is what our approach would be.

Events following the hijacking and intercept of communications between the hijackers and their controllers clearly establish Pakistan's involvement. The facilities given to the terrorists, whom we handed over the hijackers, to travel to Pakistan and to make public pronouncements, and these pronouncements being recorded and distributed in different parts of North India, within a fortnight of the speeches made in Pakistan, should make us conscious of the extent to which the Pakistani ISI network has spread its tentacles in India. It would be sufficient to inform foreign governments and concerned UN agencies about Pakistani sponsored terrorism in India on a continuous basis. There is no point in beseeching the world to give negative certificates toPakistan. We should deal with Pakistan as best as we can.

The Taliban government undoubtedly contributed in a marginal way to defuse the crisis. But it was not because of any particular empathy or goodwill towards India. A cardinal motivation of the Taliban was to safeguard its own credibility and image in the context of international, particularly US, pressure. There is no harm in acknowledging the Taliban's role subject to this awareness. We must also indicate that if the Taliban gains effective control over Afghanistan and stabilises the situation in that country in a harmonious manner, respecting human rights, we would be willing to deal with them. Relations with the Taliban will be an exercise in practical politics.