Talibanise Pakistan for the public good

Talibanise Pakistan for the public good
S C N Jatar

Many of us attribute a different reason for indirect pressure on US President Bill Clinton to skip Pakistan during his visit to the subcontinent (`For the general good' by Shekhar Gupta, February 5). It is not to score a point over Washington. It has only an indirect connection to India seeking "big power status". It is worth it even at a price.

We want Musharraf to "react most bitterly and viciously". We want to provoke him into paying "the US and India back for Pakistan's humiliation". We want to outflank him strategically and diplomatically. However, for this India must prepare herself to face the military threat from Pakistan. "Vacate POK before talks" is mere rhetoric unless backed by the ability to evict Pakistan from POK. It is pointless talking tough without the capability to translate the tough talks into action. It is meaningless having that capability without the political will to translate the intentions into action.

Consider the facts. The Kargil conflict was two months old and we were shopping abroad for basics such as snow boots, clothing and headgear. In the midst of the conflict, our army chief stated that the army would make the best of whatever they have. This shows that we were surprised in Kargil -- militarily, strategically, diplomatically, politically. Militarily, we did not have the equipment. Strategically, we did not have any counter-offensive plans to combat a Kargil-type situation. If we had, it was only on paper because we did not have the force level or the equipment for it. Our diplomacy was an abject failure because we had not come out of the Lahore Declaration euphoria. Politically, it is only a tentative win because the government is keeping the Subrahmanyam Committee report under wraps.

A draw in 1965 and a win in 1971. A bailout in Kargil, by the US. Pakistan succeeded partially in conveying that India is bull-headed about Kashmir. Our former foreign secretary, J.N. Dixit, says that the West's favourable reaction is temporary, tenuous, event-specific and short-term. Their reaction to Kargil is not their basic orientation or policy. They are not interested in the wishes of the people of Kashmir or the plight of the Kashmiri Pandits.

First, the nuclear blackmail. Now, the blackmail of Talibanisation of Pakistan. Pakistan surely knows that in a nuclear war, India would come out the better because of not only the superiority of our nuclear preparedness but because of the size of our country. We can prevent Talibanisation of Pakistan, not by Clinton's visit, but by conveying to Pakistan that it would not pay them to Talibanise and by backing it up with our intentions and capabilities. We were in a position to dictate terms to Pakistan in 1971 when we had over 90,000 Pak prisoners of war. We could have used them as a lever to bend Pakistan to our way of thinking. We had then beaten Pakistan in all respects by our political will to translate our intentions into action backed by demonstrated capability to do so. We missed that historic opportunity.

The time has come to repeat a 1971 but with a better stratagem!