Inside story of the Indo-US lovefest

Inside story of the Indo-US lovefest
Chidanand Rajghatta

Bill Clinton’s second term in the White House has changed the paradigm of Indo-US relations. The image of the evil Uncle Sam was replaced by a democratic big brother willing to support India in its diplomatic battle against Pakistan. Chidanand Rajghatta talks to insiders in Clinton administration to chart out how the turnaround was achieved.

When officials of the Clinton White House leave their workplace for the last time Friday evening, they will each leave a single sheet of paper on the table for their successor. A rather inexplicable federal law enjoins the outgoing administration to clear out every file, paper and memo from the White House, no matter how crucial (the law applies only to the White House and not to other sections of the government). All the papers are sent to the library of the outgoing President.

For the key official in the Clinton White House dealing with South Asia, the single sheet he will leave behind for his successor in the Bush White House will likely contain the following points:

* The Clinton Administration, at the start of its second term, ‘‘consciously’’ decided to transform Indo-US relations by delinking it from the India-Pakistan straight jacket and an overly arms control approach.

* The new policy received a setback with India’s May 1998 nuclear tests, but was quickly put back on track by the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott talks which led to the ‘‘first sustained strategic dialogue’’ between the two sides.

* The Indo-US pact was sealed and strengthened by the Kargil episode, a perfidious and reckless adventure by Pakistan that invited a firm but restrained response from India. The Kargil affair was also an ‘eye-opener’ for Washington and led to it recasting its whole approach to the area by looking at New Delhi as a credible and responsible power.

Implicit in the Clinton Administration’s handing over note to the Bush dispensation will be the message that Indo-US ties have undergone a qualitative change in consonance with the new strategic paradigms for the region. South Asia continues to be powder keg and Washington has to work with New Delhi and Islamabad to resolve the issues; and the Pakistani gambit of forcibly redrawing of borders cannot be allowed.

Senior Clinton Administration officials last week provided an exclusive in-depth retrospective of the evolution of Indo-US ties in the Clinton years, walking this correspondent through the start of the engagement to the final exuberant months when leaders of the two countries exchanged back-to-back visits.

The officials said the dramatic shift in US policy began at the start of the Clinton second term and was primarily driven by the President himself. The change was engendered by the President’s own reading and understanding of the region’s history, the energy and vibrancy of India’s plural, multi-hued democracy, the First Lady’s accounts of her visit to India, and their interactions with key (and unidentified) Indians.

At a White House meeting called to specifically discuss the administration’s policy towards the region in the spring of 1997, it was decided that US relations with India would be delinked from its ties with Pakistan. It was also decided that Washington’s overbearing ‘arms control’ approach had been futile. While continuing to push its arms control agenda, the US would adopt a ‘multi-basket’ approach.

To convey this sense, senior administration officials, including Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and US ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson would visit the region, preparatory to a possible visit by President Clinton.

The first of the ground-breaking meetings took place between the National Security Advisers of the two countries, Sandy Berger and Brajesh Mishra, in Geneva.

Unfortunately, officials said, the new tack was scuppered by India’s unexpected nuclear tests in May 1998 that came within days of Richardson’s visit.

Richardson’s report on his return had been so gung-ho about India that the sudden tests shocked the administration and there was a pervasive feeling of betrayal.

However, it was President Clinton again who decided that the nuclear hump could and should be overcome. He deputed his college-mate and friend Strobe Talbott to begin talks with India. But what really made the difference, officials said, were telephonic conversations between Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Clinton during which they decided that the dialogue would be sustained and substantive. ‘‘This led to an unprecedented level of candour in the discussions,’’ officials said.

The officials then described the Kargil episode as the ‘single most important factor’ in transforming the relationship from ‘words to action’. First of all, Kargil was an eye-opener to Washington, the officials said. The facts were relatively straight that Pakistan was the aggressor. But what really helped build the Indo-US compact were two factors: The US came out unequivocally against Pakistani aggression (‘‘which in turn was an eye-opener for India,’’ one official said). India’s measured response impressed Washington.

‘‘The best Army in the world would have found it difficult to take back the heights. There must have been great temptation to open another front,’’ another official said, suggesting that such a restrained response galvanised the president to take a direct and forceful role.

Officials then painted a picture of a flurry of phone calls with the president calling Vajpayee, constant interaction between Sandy Berger and Brajesh Mishra and phone calls from Gen. Anthony Zinni to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif asking him in no uncertain terms to back off (Clinton himself did not talk to Sharif).

US pressure on Pakistan was so intense that Sharif sought to come to Washington to plead his case. President Clinton’s message, they said, was direct: Come only if you will agree to withdraw. Islamabad was also told that it would responsible for any consequences arising from its aggression.

The Kargil episode, officials said, instilled a new sense of confidence that the two sides (India and US) could work together in handling tough situations. That sense was further strengthened during the Kandahar hijacking, when India was again a victim of terrorism.

It was during this episode that Washington came closest to directly accusing Pakistan of terrorism, by declaring that ‘‘the hijackers had the backing of some sections of the Pakistani army and intelligence’’.

The officials said the Clinton’s visit to India in the spring of 2000 was successful ‘‘beyond wildest expectations’’ and the President was thrilled. The White House worked very hard on the trip and ‘‘it was our intent to break all the stereotypes and explain to Indians and Americans what this trip is all about’’.

The officials said Washington was anxious for the trip to succeed that they studied all the reports of recent foreign trips to India, ‘‘especially those by our British colleagues’’ to avoid mistakes.

The massacre in Chittisingpora at the start of the trip shook the Americans, but it made the President even more determined to reach out to the Indian people, officials said. It was then that he decided to meet with Rachna Katyal, whose husband had been killed by the hijackers of the Indian Airlines plane. ‘‘He wanted to do it a low-key way and make it clear it was not a show,’’ officials said.

The Indo-US engagement was rounded off by Prime Minister Vajpayee’s reciprocal visit to the US in the fall, a trip officials described as ‘‘very successful’’.The officials, some of whom are career civil servants who will remain in the government (although perhaps not in such pivotal positions as far as South Asia is concerned), would not hazard any detailed speculation about how things might turn out in a Bush dispensation. But they suggested that a solid foundation had been laid for Indo-US ties and there could be a broad continuity in policy.