A Fractious focus on technical trivia, we have repeatedly underlined on these pages, had marked India’s negotiating style in the implementation of the historic nuclear deal signed by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July 2005. Until now, at least. After three days of intense but inconclusive nuclear talks last week, we find the US afflicted by a more virulent form of the same disease — a tendency to forget the larger political context in a complex technical negotiation. By refusing to concede India’s right to reprocess spent fuel, the American bureaucracy has thrown a monkey wrench into the drafting of the so-called ‘123 agreement’ that provides the legal basis for civilian nuclear cooperation.

The two arguments advanced by the US against reprocessing make no sense. One is that the reprocessing of spent fuel is a long way down the road and therefore could be left out of the 123 agreement for the moment. The Department of Atomic Energy has rightly insisted that without an explicit reference to reprocessing rights, there can be no agreement. Even the paranoids, it is said, have enemies. The DAE points to the experience of the Tarapur nuclear power plant bought from the US in 1963. The terms of that purchase said New Delhi and Washington would make a “joint determination” on reprocessing at an appropriate moment. Later, the US would neither let India reprocess the spent fuel nor take it back. Given that bitter experience, it would be very difficult for any reasonable opinion in India, let alone the DAE, to accept a 123 agreement without an upfront and unambiguous recognition of the right to reprocess.

... contd.