The India-US statement and the subsequent discussions have generated a lot of discussion, charges and counter-charges. The following is an attempt to clarify some of the issues in simple terms. The attempt will be to compare the environment in terms of some of the factors that have a role in evaluating the impact of the agreement when it is complete in all respects — that is, after the completion of the 123 agreement, the NSG amendment and the India-specific IAEA safeguards agreement. The elements that will be compared are: one, the international environment in the nuclear arena, two, the Indian strategic nuclear programme, and three, the Indian civil nuclear programme.

International nuclear relations

India had decided not to sign the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) because of the inherent unequal nature of the treaty which sought to legitimise the nuclear weapon status of five countries that had already detonated nuclear devices. The non-nuclear weapon states, as defined by the NPT, were expected to forego nuclear weapons and engage only in civil nuclear programmes.

In 1992 the Nuclear Suppliers Group modified their nuclear transfer guidelines to require all non-nuclear weapon states to agree to IAEA fullscope safeguards placing all nuclear activities in their control under IAEA safeguards. Both as a matter of principle and also since it had a nuclear programme, India did not accept IAEA fullscope safeguards in India. As a result NSG members are barred from civilian nuclear transfers to India. In what manner, if any, would the agreement change this international nuclear environment? (See Table 1)

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