Reports from the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva inform us that a fourth coordinator has been named to deal with the discussions on the draft nuclear fissile materials cut off treaty which had been stalled for well over a decade. Some well-informed observers in the country have raised the issue of the US policy of pressing for the treaty without any verification provision. At present, it is too early to say whether the US draft tabled last year will make any progress in the conference.

There are very strong objections to a fissile materials cut off which is not subject to verification. The North Korean nuclear test, the Security Council sanctions on Iran for its failure to comply with the demand to cease its uranium enrichment, the nuclear Walmart run by Dr A.Q. Khan for well over 16 years (and still continuing, according to US observers), the proliferation from one of the major weapon powers to a non-weapon state in the eighties and nineties, Iraq running a parallel nuclear programme outside the IAEA inspection regime and the rationale for the institution of the proliferation security initiative by the US and its allies highlight the need for an effective verification regime.

The fissile materials cut off treaty will cover only the production of fissile materials for weapon purposes and not plutonium and enriched uranium for non-weapon purposes such as energy generation, submarine propulsion etc. The US and western countries suspect that Iran, which says it is carrying out uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes, can easily extend it to produce weapon-grade material. There have been more attempts at weapon proliferation with enriched uranium than plutonium. In these circumstances, it will not be surprising if there is a vigorous and prolonged discussion on the verification issue.

... contd.