Pakistan is in a state of emergency. President Pervez Musharraf terms the supra-constitutional measure a weapon against increasing Talibanisation, and he believes that the situation was made worse by unwarranted judicial and media activism. Many have argued against such justification of the emergency, but few would argue about Pakistan’s main threat. It’s not India, it’s the Taliban, stupid! For the first time in more than 30 years, Pakistan is consumed by an internal threat — a predominantly Pashtun ethnic separatist movement, which has joined forces with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda against the Pakistani military on the enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend logic. South Waziristan under Baitullah Mehsud and the Swat valley under Maulana Fazullah are shocking examples of increasing Taliban control in and outside the tribal areas.

However, Islamabad’s response to the threat is marred by contradictions; some in the intelligence, military and political communities still believe that regional security interests are better served by co-opting the Taliban to counterbalance India’s rising influence in Kabul, and possibly Kashmir. But there is also great US pressure to destroy all Taliban sanctuaries. End result: a short-term reactive posture, not a cohesive policy, towards the Taliban.

The federally administered tribal areas, surrounded by Afghanistan, NWFP and Baluchistan, provide the base for a complex and dynamic Pashtun insurgency. Since the fifties, the area has had more autonomy than any other region of Pakistan. Although federal and provincial laws do not apply to tribal areas, the Pakistan president, under the constitution (now in abeyance), can enforce certain laws through the governor of NWFP, who can then delegate ordinances to political agents. These agents, suspiciously elected on non-party basis, represent their respective agencies in both houses of parliament.

... contd.