Things started changing at about 3.00 pm on July 28 when a group of 15 soldiers from the bordering country, bearing a white flag, walked into the Indian side of the border. As troops watched, Pakistan soldiers crossed more than 200 metres into Indian territory and demanded that the post be dismantled. It was the first incident of its kind in the country.

In an ensuing altercation that neither side is still very forthcoming about, a Pakistani soldier opened fire, killing an Indian jawan. In retaliatory fire from Indian posts, seven Pakistani soldiers, including an officer, were gunned down.

And, with this came to light a new trend along the 788-km LoC that had remained peaceful since the November 2003 ceasefire agreement. While the agreement still holds, a series of fairly low-level incidents that have taken place along the border in the past two months have opened up a new front for the Indian Army.

In several cases — including three between August 8 and 16 in the Kamalkote area — armed personnel crossed into Indian territory to fire at forward posts. Although most such attacks are not enough to cause serious damage, they do hamper Indian troops from carrying out patrols. This ‘trend’ points towards a tactical change from Pakistan, made more notable now with Musharraf out of power and the US cracking down on the country’s role in training terrorist outfits — this series of small-scale incidents keep the situation at the LoC volatile, but mask any possible support from Pakistan to militants.

“There seems to be a deliberate decision to work out the threshold of the Indian Army’s tolerance. The firing incidents are carried out by small teams in daylight who are dressed in either combat fatigues, track suits or salwar suits. The fire takes places from in between Pakistan posts,” says Major General S A Hasnain, GOC of the Baramulla-based Dagger division that controls a 130-km LoC stretch along which most of the ceasefire violations have taken place.

The aim of carrying out such operations, the officer says, is to compel India to reconfigure its counter-insurgency infrastructure by forcing troops to restrict their movement and, as a result, opening an access route to militants.

“The incidents were aimed at creating gaps in the counter-insurgency grid,” Hasnain says.

The events, which have been followed by vehement denials by Pakistani officers during flag meetings conducted to lodge protests, have also brought back recollections of a tumultuous past. “In a way, the tactics used during the Kargil war come back to mind when Pakistani officers say the incidents are being carried out by our own people, i.e. Kashmiri insurgents,” a top officer says. Tellingly, along the entire LoC that lies north of the Pir Panjal range, not even a single cross-firing incident has been reported since November 2003. However, after the July 28 incident, eight major attacks on Indian troops have taken place in the area while south of Pir Panjal — in sectors such as Rajouri and Poonch — more than 15 violations have been reported since July.

The Army says more than 70 per cent of the cross-firing incidents have happened on areas manned by BSF personnel. At places like the strategic Pir Bhadreshwar in Rajouri, the Army is already strengthening BSF positions. “We have boosted BSF positions with our own men after firing incidents on their posts in the Poonch sector,” says Lt Col TJ Singh, the Officiating Commanding Officer of 2 Sikh Light Infantry that is holding the ridge.

Meanwhile, the Army is also making sure that its troops are prepared for attacks. At Tut Mari Gali (TMG), for example — barely a km away from where the July 28 incident occurred — where Indian posts are located at heights of over 12,000 feet and overlook Pakistan’s Leepa valley, things have also tightened up.

The Army has already brought out a ‘digest of service’, a record of daily events that take place in the region, and have mapped posts that were targeted during the pre-ceasefire days. Officers who served in the region before 2003 have also been consulted for advice on where ceasefire violations are likely to take place.

“We need to respect the ceasefire, but also strike a balance between an effective response and a restrained response,” says Brig J S Cheema, Commander of the TMG Brigade.

Meanwhile, the top leadership is wary of the security situation on the LoC. “These incidents will continue till the political situation in Pakistan becomes more stable. With the Pakistan Army facing humiliation on their Western borders, these incidents are also a way for them to regain face. We have to plan with the premise that such incidents are here to stay for quite some time,” says a top Indian Army officer.

Major incidents

•July 28: Pakistan troops march in, kill Indian soldier in Nowgam

• July 30: Mortars fired at Indian positions in Nerian sector

• August 6: Six to eight armed men come into Indian territory and fire at Army post in Nowgam

• August 8: Pakistani soldier fires at Indian posts in Kamalkote area after crossing the LoC

• August 10: Attackers lay ambush and fire at Indian patrol in Kamalkote

• August 16: One Indian soldier killed after patrol comes under fire

• August 16: One bunker is damaged at Pir Bhadreshwar in Rajouri by mortar fire

• August 21: 8 mortar rounds, 2 rocket-propelled grenades fired at Indian post in Pir Bhadreshwar

• August 26: Mortars fired at Indian posts in Poonch. Two soldiers injured in attack