Opinion A quandary for Obama

Syria today is arguably the principal hotspot on the globe,posing an almost insoluble quandary for Western powers. The unfolding brutality of events confront them with a classic “damned if you do,damned if you don’t” dilemma. There are so many potentially interacting variables that it is impossible to forecast outcomes. The inherent uncertainty was reflected in the words of Kentucky Senator Rand Paul,warning against US intervention: “It is unclear what national security interests we have in the civil war in Syria… It is very clear that any attempt to aid the Syrian rebels would be complicated and dangerous,precisely because we don’t know who these people are.” The conflagration is fanned by the confluence of several socio-political fronts — sectarian enmities,societal grievances and geopolitical rivalries — each of which adds to the savagery.

It is against this grim backdrop that both the Obama administration’s declaration and the recent EU decision not to continue the embargo on arms to the rebels should be evaluated. Of course,given the prevailing political wisdom in the wake of the “Arab Spring”,the knee-jerk reaction is to back the opposition to the brutal Assad regime — until one takes a closer look at who the rebels really are,and whether their victory could in any way provide a better future for the “Syrian people”,whatever significance that term might have in a post-civil war reality. Indeed,as Paulo Pinheiro,the Brazilian head of the UN investigatory team,commented,“there is only a minority of [opposition fighters with a democratic history who believe in the Syrian mosaic and want a state for all.”

The operational impact of the US decision is yet to be seen. The current administration would certainly be loath to risk any entanglement involving US troops in largescale combat situations. Aerial activity could entail complications with Russia,which has claimed it is committed to deliver advanced anti-aircraft systems to Assad. Despite the fact that the EU’s decision was more declarative than operational,with both London and Paris agreeing that no arms would be delivered until August,it nevertheless set off a furore. Predictably,the US approved. Equally predictably,Russia disapproved.

Clearly,Washington could now find itself,as at the G-8 summit,in the somewhat difficult position of condemning Russian arms deliveries to Assad while approving potential US and EU supplies to his adversaries. Indeed,with talk of a no-fly zone being possibly imposed in future,Moscow may well exploit these recent moves to portray its own delivery of weapons to Syria — including advanced anti-aircraft missiles — as a “deterrence against foreign intervention”. Whether or not the West eventually does decide to deliver arms to Assad’s adversaries,there is considerable doubt as to the benefits. If it does deliver them,there is the prospect of the weapons falling into the hands of the radicalised and vehemently anti-Western Islamists. If the West refrains from doing so,it will incur the ire of both sides: angering the Assad regime for the decision itself,while alienating the opposition for not executing it.

Increasingly,the violence is showing signs of “bursting its banks” and flowing over not only into Syria’s immediate neighbours but beyond. This is no longer confined to the occasional cross-border firing and the flight of refugees — mainly to Turkey,since Jordan has reportedly closed its borders to them. The possible repercussions are myriad: the EU decision has already jeopardised the future of UN forces on the Golan Heights monitoring the Israeli-Syrian ceasefire. Austria has pulled out its large contingent of troops,fearing they might be endangered by the decision to arm Assad’s opponents. But even graver consequences are emerging.

The increasing participation of Shiite Hezbollah forces from Lebanon,in support of their Iranian patron’s ally,Assad,against his largely Sunni opponents — notably in and around the strategic town of Qusayr,recently retaken by pro-regime forces — dramatically underscores the plausibility of this ominous prognosis. The Sunni-Shia schism widened even further with the news that the largely Sunni Gulf Cooperation Council will consider taking action against Hezbollah if it continues its “brazen intervention”. This statement came shortly after the Gaza-based Hamas turned publicly against Assad,their long-time former ally,endorsing the revolt. For Israel,deeply concerned about the possible transfer of advanced armaments from Assad to Hezbollah,this opens up the intriguing possibility of a potential clash between Hamas and Hezbollah,two of its most implacable foes,whose enmity towards Israel has hitherto papered over their Shia-Sunni animosities.

There can,of course,be no doubt of the strategic value the Assad regime has for Tehran. Paradoxically,the ongoing assault aimed at unseating him may in fact have a little noticed,but vital,strategic benefit for the Iranian leadership. As the conflict,and its ensuing carnage,continues,it provides a welcome diversion from Iran’s determined drive to acquire weaponised nuclear capability. That just might turn out to be the most significant long-term strategic repercussion of Syria’s bloody civil war — and the greatest service Assad could provide his Iranian patrons.

The writer is the founder and executive director of the Israel Institute for Strategic Studies