
As the focus shifts from Operation Black Tornado to the predictable bickering at home, Manmohan Singh faces an even bigger challenge on the diplomatic front. He has already pointed a finger at the militant groups operating in Pakistan and warned Islamabad that it will have to pay if it can’t stop the extremists operating on its soil.
Yet another crisis in Indo-Pak relations is at hand. The prospects for its rapid regionalisation, to include Afghanistan, and inevitable internationalisation, involving the US and NATO, are now real.
India’s friends will wonder — its enemies have already bet on the UPA government’s weakness — whether Dr Singh has the strategic resolve for a new confrontation with Pakistan’s armed forces and direct it towards a credible set of political objectives.The decision to replace Shivraj Patil with P. Chidambaram at the home ministry suggests that the UPA government may finally be ready to take major political decisions in confronting the national security crisis at hand.
Dr Singh knows one of the first principles of statecraft is not to issue threats that cannot be carried out. If he fails to act on his promise to raise the costs to Pakistan, the credibility of his government will sink even lower. The question is not whether India should act, but how.
In developing a response to the Mumbai aggression, Dr. Singh will have to review the military/nuclear crises with Islamabad over the last decade.
In 1999, when the NDA government led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee discovered the occupation of Kargil heights in Jammu and Kashmir by the Pakistan army, it had no option but to embark on a limited war to reclaim Indian territory. Vajpayee faced a more complicated situation during 2001. In its audacity and intended political consequences, the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001 is the closest parallel to the Mumbai attacks last week.
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