After considering and ruling out immediate air strikes on terrorist camps across the border, and announcing a series of rather ineffective sanctions against Pakistan, Vajpayee turned to what was then called “coercive diplomacy”. He ordered the full mobilisation of the Indian armed forces on the border and gathered the navy in the Arabian Sea.

India threatened to go to war with Pakistan, with all its consequences including nuclear, if Islamabad did not end cross-border terrorism. Analysts in India and abroad are divided over the effectiveness of India’s coercive diplomacy during 2001-02. It nevertheless saw the US along with Britain exert pressure on Pakistan’s president, General Pervez Musharraf, who agreed to end cross-border terrorism on a permanent basis.

Musharraf’s promise became the eventual basis for the new peace process that was launched in January 2004. After Mumbai we are now back to square one, confronting the same dilemmas. The option of threatening a war and actually going to one must remain in Dr Singh’s political quiver. Any decision to confront the Pakistan army, however, must be crafted with great care and take into account the significant differences in the political context between 2001 and 2008. Letting outrage and domestic posturing drive policy could make matters a lot worse for India.

One major difference between 2001 and 2008 is Pakistan’s internal situation. Musharraf then was the unchallenged CEO of Pakistan. In contrast, Pakistan’s power structure is fragmented today. While Pakistan’s civilian leadership led by President Asif Ali Zardari has signaled its positive intent towards India, its security establishment has done the exact opposite.

... contd.