In 1999 Indian policy-makers had to consider intelligence information that Musharraf may not have fully informed the civilian prime minister on the Kargil operations. This time, India will have to factor in the possibility that Pakistan’s president and PM may have been in the dark about the planning and execution of the Mumbai aggression.

In their statements last week, Dr Singh and External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee have been careful not to blame the Pakistani leadership for the Mumbai attacks. They, instead, pointed to “elements inside Pakistan”. Zardari, in turn, has been definitive in his offer to act against any group in Pakistan, if it is shown to have links to the Mumbai aggression.

India’s actions in the next few days must be sensitive to the internal divide in Pakistan. India’s case that the Mumbai attacks are linked to groups operating in Pakistan must be strong enough to mobilise significant international pressure to test Zardari’s offer to act against these groups and their patrons in the security establishment.

Unlike in 2001, India will also have to factor Afghanistan into the equation. Official reports from Islamabad suggest that Pakistan army is ready to shift its troops from the Afghan border to the east. Pakistan’s army, never enthusiastic to join the US and NATO in the fight against the extremists on its western borderlands, is quite clearly eager to shift the political focus from Afghanistan to India.

It clearly hopes to leverage this threat with Washington at a time when the US and NATO desperately need the Pakistan army’s cooperation to stabilise the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. New Delhi’s challenge, however, is to ensure that the current crisis will lead to lasting changes in Pakistan’s policy to the benefit of both Afghanistan and India.

... contd.