This is in line with the post-Pokhran approach followed by the NDA. Atal Bihari Vajpayee had stated at the UN general assembly September 24, 1998 that India was willing to “move towards a de jure formalisation” of its moratorium. Jaswant Singh had written in Foreign Affairs that “since India already subscribes to the substance of the test ban treaty, all that remains is its actual signature”.

What has been suggested now is a “voluntary moratorium on testing” which falls short of any de jure commitment.

The US has cancelled its obligations to facilitate alternate fuel supplies from friendly countries in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The final bill bars building strategic reserves for lifetime running of Indian reactors. In sum, there is no assurance on fuel supplies as the PM had stated on August 17.

Specifically responding to this Section 103 (10), Condoleezza Rice had stated in her letter to the conference heads that such references in the “Statement of Policy” section “would infringe upon the president’s constitutional authority to conduct the nation’s foreign affairs”. This clearly indicates the US administration’s willingness to go ahead with its commitments on this issue.

These provisions are not binding on the US administration. Moreover, the March 2 separation plan, agreed to by the US clearly states that the assurance on strategic fuel reserves will be part of the 123 bilateral agreement.

Finally, it is for the US administration to assess how the legislation restricts or enables them to fulfil their commitments. If repeated statements from Washington unambiguously say that they are confident of fulfilling their July 18 and March 2 commitments, then why the effort here to help unburden them of this responsibility?

... contd.