The most devastating fallout of this came just over two hours later when ATS chief Hemant Karkare, Additional Commissioner of Police Ashok Kamte and encounter specialist Vijay Salaskar rushed into a combat zone with little information or planning and ended up paying for it with their lives. But more of that later.

Right from the very first response, the confusion was all too evident as Abu Shoaib and Abu Umer entered Café Leopold restaurant in Colaba just after 9.30 pm, shot at diners and hurled at least two grenades.

Three policemen from the Colaba Police Station, located diagonally opposite Leo’s, ran out of their compound on hearing a “loud noise” but when they saw firing, they rushed back in to get their weapons. By the time they returned with their 303s and SLRs, it was too late. Shoaib and Umer had killed 11 people, including two foreigners, wounded 28 and fled -- into the Taj Mahal hotel, barely minutes away.

By now, the Mumbai Police wireless network was crackling. Records accessed by The Indian Express show that the first message of the attack to the central Control Room reached at 9.48 pm and was instantly relayed to mobile patrols.

It's here that all procedure broke down.

The SOP clearly says the DCP should immediately take charge of a "crisis spot" and this should be replicated if there are "multiple crisis spots." It also specifies that in case of such an emergency, the Mumbai Police Commissioner should immediately hold a crisis meeting to plan the immediate response. All this is to ensure that in the shortest possible time, a unified command and control centre is in place that coordinates field operations based on inputs from DCPs across the city.

... contd.