That said, the lack of transparency should not be overemphasised. Most relevant information concerning the deal could have been gleaned from public source material. Almost every aspect of the deal was examined and dissected in the Indian media and all major documents and agreements concerning the deal were made public at relevant junctures.

However, the combination of opacity and lack of capacity in Washington did have

some negative consequences. Among other things, it contributed indirectly to the misplaced fears concerning the

India-Iran relationship, the pernicious clauses that made their way into the Hyde Act, and the widespread and frequent non-proliferation scares pertaining to the deal.

Looking further ahead, such deficiencies helped contribute to one presidential candidate’s less than enthusiastic approach to the nuclear deal. While Barack Obama’s interview in Outlook was widely heralded as signalling his approval for the deal, the candidate’s wording should not inspire much confidence. “I had some concerns about the non-proliferation aspects of the original agreement when it was debated in Congress,” Obama said. “I will continue to make sure that our respective strategic, non-proliferation, and energy and environment interests are all advanced by the ultimate deal...The existing agreement effectively balanced a range of important issues — from our strategic relationship with India to our non-proliferation concerns to India’s energy needs. I am therefore reluctant to seek changes.” That hardly reads like a ringing endorsement.

When the histories of the nuclear agreement are written (as indeed some already are), they should note that the difficulties in seeing through the nuclear deal were at least in small part due to such factors.

... contd.