All of us know how important an independent Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) is in a democratic system. The CAG is our SAI. How then is that position to be filled? To state the obvious, a careful selection of a suitable person has to be made; and those two terms imply criteria and procedures. In any case, it is clear that some kind of selection is in fact taking place, but no one outside a charmed circle in the government knows what is going on. To all of us, the matter is shrouded in mystery until suddenly one day an announcement appears that X has been appointed as the CAG of India. What confidence can anyone have in a supreme enforcer of public accountability appointed in such a supremely non-accountable and opaque manner?

Given the fault-finding nature of the audit function, the bureaucracy and the political levels involved in the selection cannot be expected to be enthusiastic about appointing someone who has a reputation for strictness, independence and fierce integrity. They may also be tempted to regard the position of CAG as a plum post to be offered to a favoured retiring bureaucrat. If such tendencies are to be corrected, then it seems clear that the selection should be open to public scrutiny, and that some from outside the executive government should be associated with the selection. A committee procedure is in place for the selection of the chairman and members of the National Human Rights Commission and of the Chief Vigilance Commissioner. What argument can there be for not adopting a similar procedure for the selection of the CAG?

In the absence of knowledge of how selections are in fact made, we can draw some inferences about the criteria from the appointments actually made. All the CAGs have been secretaries to the government of India, and the last six CAGs have been from the IAS. First, the criterion that the person to be appointed as CAG must have been a secretary to the government of India is very debatable. Secondly, a decided preference for the IAS (to put it very mildly) seems to have been operating.

Let us turn to the question of the need for a knowledge and experience of accounts and audit work. Certainly, as stated by T. T. Krishnamachari in the constituent assembly, the CAG is much more than an accountant, but it does not follow that the CAG need not be, or should not be, an accountant at all. Let us not forget the title of the post. The Constitution specifically relates his duties to the accounts of the union and the states. The audit of those accounts is the primary function of the CAG, and all other aspects and dimensions are added to it. To say that an auditor general need not be an auditor is to stand things on their head.

In general, it may be said that at the highest level, the head of any organisation or system must transcend the technicalities of that organisation or system and have the capacity for a larger and wider perspective. Would anyone proceed to argue that the foreign secretary need not be a professional diplomat, that the chairman railway board need not be from the railways, that the CJI need not have a law background, or that the chiefs of the forces need not be from those forces? How then can we ignore the professional aspect of the CAG’s work and regard the CAG as a super-manager who can get all the technical support he needs from the organisation below him?

There is one more disquieting aspect to the stress on ‘higher’ functions: it implies an unstated downgrading of the basic audit function. The general tendency is to dismiss audit as routine and pettifogging and to say that the CAG and his department should do better things with their time. In India, where the standards of probity in government cannot be called high, we simply cannot afford to be dismissive of audit.

Finally, we come to the question of judicial intervention. It is naïve to expect the political executive to surrender voluntarily its present freedom and discretion to appoint whomever it chooses for whatever reason; or the bureaucracy to give up the power and patronage it now has in this matter; or the IAS as a guild to let go of the edge the service now has. Parliament for its part cannot pass any law unless the executive brings forward a bill, which of course the executive is unlikely to do. Under the circumstances, the judiciary can be legitimately expected to intervene in order to ensure that a constitutional position is not subverted by inappropriate modes of appointment. (This is not a reflection on individual incumbents of the position.)

The Supreme Court, which has taken much interest in the CBI, the CVC, and so on, seems reluctant to show a similar interest in the institution of the CAG. Will Parliament, and in particular the public accounts committee and the committee on public enterprises, give some evidence of concern? If they too are not very interested, we might well say “CAG: RIP”

The writer is an honorary research professor at the Centre for Policy Research