There is one more disquieting aspect to the stress on ‘higher’ functions: it implies an unstated downgrading of the basic audit function. The general tendency is to dismiss audit as routine and pettifogging and to say that the CAG and his department should do better things with their time. In India, where the standards of probity in government cannot be called high, we simply cannot afford to be dismissive of audit.

Finally, we come to the question of judicial intervention. It is naïve to expect the political executive to surrender voluntarily its present freedom and discretion to appoint whomever it chooses for whatever reason; or the bureaucracy to give up the power and patronage it now has in this matter; or the IAS as a guild to let go of the edge the service now has. Parliament for its part cannot pass any law unless the executive brings forward a bill, which of course the executive is unlikely to do. Under the circumstances, the judiciary can be legitimately expected to intervene in order to ensure that a constitutional position is not subverted by inappropriate modes of appointment. (This is not a reflection on individual incumbents of the position.)

The Supreme Court, which has taken much interest in the CBI, the CVC, and so on, seems reluctant to show a similar interest in the institution of the CAG. Will Parliament, and in particular the public accounts committee and the committee on public enterprises, give some evidence of concern? If they too are not very interested, we might well say “CAG: RIP”

... contd.