“Producing a hydrogen bomb is no simple thing and it seems to have worked. The tests were done one after the other, which is tremendous. And the secrecy was maintained,” the grand old man of India’s nuclear programme said, sounding triumphant even though he had no obvious direct role in Pokharan II. The symbolism of nuclear power too seemed to matter equally for him.

Having faced the worst of the technology denial regimes post-1974, and having struggled to keep the nuclear programme afloat, May 11, 1998, seemed like an appropriate occasion to ventilate for the scientist-pianist who was almost forced by Saddam Hussein to stay in Baghdad and help build the Iraqi bomb.

“It took us time to recover from the Western world’s sanctions after the 1974 tests,” he said, adding that he was bitter about India’s nuclear energy not being allowed to be harnessed productively to generate electricity. “But we’ll have to face the consequences again,” he said matter-of-factly.

Much heavy water has since flowed under the bridge. From facing several more years of sanctions and almost having the CTBT thrust down its gullet after Pokharan II, New Delhi seemed set to manage the unmanageable and emerge from its nuclear winter with a historic nuclear deal with the United States few experts have found fault with.

Since he died less than a year before President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed in principle to the nuclear deal in July 2005, the country is that much unfortunate in that it does not know how Ramanna would have reacted to it.

... contd.